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NOTES
POST-DA VIS CONDUIT BONDS: AT THE
INTERSECTION OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE
CLAUSE AND MUNICIPAL DEBT
Sean Carey*
This Note addresses the constitutionality of the selective taxation of
conduit bonds, a subset of municipal bonds thatfinance private enterprise,
in the aftermath of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Department of
Revenue v. Davis. In Davis, the Court determined that states could tax
interest earned on out-of-state municipal bonds while exempting interest
earned on its own bonds without violating the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution. When issuing this ruling, the Court drew a distinction
between municipal bonds issued on behalfof the government and municipal
bonds issued on behalfof private industry. The question of whether or not
selective taxation was constitutional as applied to municipal bonds issued
on behalf ofprivate industry was explicitly left for another day. This Note
begins with a discussion of municipal bonds and the dormant Commerce
Clause. Next, this Note reviews the arguments for and against subjecting
conduit bonds to the selective tax system. Finally, this Note recommends
the adoption of a sui generis assessment to identify bonds whose central
purpose is economic protectionism so that they may be excluded from the
selective tax system.
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INTRODUCTION

In 2006, the New York Yankees received $942.5 million in tax-exempt
conduit bonds' to build a new stadium. 2 In 2008, the Yankees entered a
1. Conduit bonds are bonds in which a state or municipality serves as a conduit to

provide financing for nongovernmental third parties. See Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S.
Ct. 1801, 1805 n.2 (2008) (plurality opinion) (referring to municipal bonds used to finance

projects by private entities as "private-activity," "industrial-revenue," or "conduit."); see
also Frequently Asked Questions About State Debt, http://www.osc.state.ny.us/
press/debtfaq.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2009) (using the phrase conduit bonds to refer to
bonds issued by public authorities that are often issued for the benefit of nongovernmental
third parties). I decided to use the phrase "conduit bonds" as opposed to "private-activity

bonds" so as not to confuse bonds that provide financing for nongovernmental third parties
with bonds that qualify for the federal tax subsidy. See I.R.C. § 141(a) (2006) (defining
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3
second request for an additional $370 million in tax-exempt conduit bonds.
In the wake of the second request, a legal battle erupted between the
Yankees and vocal critics trying to prevent the city from granting the
second request. 4 At the heart of this battle is the conflict over whether it is
appropriate for New York City to help finance a privately owned baseball
5
stadium.
Fights about conduit bonds are fights about money. Although the
specifics of how that money changes hands are highly technical, ultimately,
money flows from the public to the private sector. With every transaction
of this sort, a question arises: is this the type of project the government
should be spending money on? This question invokes others: Does this
project help the public at large? Does this project disproportionately help a
select group of people? Is financing the private sector the best way to
achieve the goals of the project?
Our federal system leaves these questions up to the state and local
legislatures. 6 The state and local legislatures issuing a given series of bonds
are best situated to appraise the benefits and burdens of that series.
However, these parties are restrained in their ability to issue bonds. States
and local governments must abide by the Federal Constitution, case law,
and fundamental principles of federalism when they sell debt to the public.7
These constraints, many of which date back to the earliest days of this
country, were erected to prevent states and municipalities from exceeding
their authority by opening their coffers to private interests and
discriminating against interstate commerce for the benefit of in-state
commerce.
Recently, a major restraint on state and municipal governments was
removed. In Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis,8 the U.S.
Supreme Court determined that states and municipalities could tax interest
earned on out-of-state municipal bonds while exempting interest on its own

private-activity bonds for the purposes of the Internal Revenue Code). See generally STAFF
OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT BONDS (Comm. Print 2006) [hereinafter STAFF OF JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND] (using the phrase to apply interchangeably between

bonds that provide financing for nongovernmental third parties and bonds that qualify for the
federal tax subsidy).
2. Richard Sandomir, Testy Tone at Hearing on Bonds for Yankees, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
15, 2009, at A30.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. ROBERT S. AMDURSKY & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, MUNICIPAL DEBT FINANCE LAW:

THEORY AND PRACTICE 9-12 (1992).
7 For example, state and municipal governments may only borrow money if the

money is for a public purpose; otherwise the issuance constitutes an unconstitutional taking
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. See
Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 238-39 (1920); see also infra Part I.A.1 (discussing the
authority of state and local governments to issue municipal bonds and the limitations on that
authority).

8. 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008) (plurality opinion).
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bonds without violating the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. 9 This
ruling hinged on a narrow government entity exception for typical and
traditional local government functions identified one year earlier in United
Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority.10
While the practice of taxing the interest on out-of-state municipal bonds and
exempting the interest on in-state bonds was already ubiquitous in the
United States, the decision raised the possibility that states and
municipalities could apply the same discriminatory tax to conduit bonds. If
this exception applies to conduit bonds, states and local governments could
discriminate against interstate commerce for the benefit of in-state private
industries despite more than two centuries of jurisprudence preventing such
activity. II
In determining the scope of its ruling, the Court drew a distinction
between municipal bonds that directly finance public works and conduit
bonds that finance private industry. The question of whether states and
municipalities could tax interest earned on out-of-state conduit bonds while
exempting interest on in-state conduit bonds was left for another day. 12 At
the same time, the market for conduit bonds has ballooned, despite efforts
by the U.S. Congress to curb their use. 13 The enormity of this market and
the very real possibility that the Davis decision could lead to a segmentation
of national markets based on the powers and efforts of local industries
requires this question to be evaluated in greater detail.
Part I of this Note begins with an overview of municipal bonds. This
section explains state and local governments' authority to issue municipal
bonds and the myriad ways that authority is abridged. This section also
reviews how the federal government and the state governments have used
tax laws to shape the municipal bond market and thereby influence the
funding of public projects. The first half of Part I concludes with an
examination of the existing municipal bond market for conduit bonds to
show the size of the current market and to provide a snapshot of some
existing issuances to illustrate how such bonds operate in practice.
The second half of Part I is dedicated to the dormant Commerce Clause,
a corollary to the Commerce Clause that prevents states and municipalities
from discriminating against interstate commerce. In the past, the dormant
Commerce Clause prevented state and local governments from
discriminating against interstate commerce for the benefit of in-state private
industries. The discussion of the dormant Commerce Clause begins with an
examination of the standard analysis conducted by courts to determine
whether legislation violates the dormant Commerce Clause. The discussion
then proceeds to exceptions to the dormant Commerce Clause. One such
9. Id. at 1819; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power
To... regulate Commerce... among the several States ... .
10. 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1794-95 (2007) (plurality opinion).
11. See infra Part 11.
12. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1805 n.2 (plurality opinion).
13. See infra notes 341-55 and accompanying text.
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exception is the market participation exception, which allows states and
municipalities to violate the dormant Commerce Clause and favor their own
citizens when they are participating in the marketplace as mere purchasers
or buyers. Another is the recently identified government-entity exception,
which allows states and municipalities to violate the dormant Commerce
Clause when the benefit accrues to a public entity while treating all private
entities exactly the same.
Part II of this Note examines the conflict between proponents and critics
of the differential taxation of conduit bonds. Each side's argument hinges
on its analysis of these bonds. Proponents of differential taxation of conduit
bonds argue that, although conduit bonds finance private industries, they
are fundamentally public. Under this interpretation, conduit bonds are
indistinguishable from governmental bonds for the purpose of applying the
government entity exception and, for the reasons outlined in Davis,
discriminatory taxation of such bonds is constitutional.
Critics of
differential taxation of conduit bonds argue that conduit bonds are
fundamentally private and are therefore distinguishable from governmental
bonds for the purpose of applying the government entity exception. Since
the government entity exception is inapplicable, the discriminatory taxation
of conduit bonds is unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause.
Part III recommends the adoption of a sui generis assessment for each
issuance of municipal bonds. This assessment, which would be similar in
application to the public purpose test that already applies to every issuance
of municipal bonds, would allow courts to distinguish conduit bonds whose
central purpose is local economic protectionism. Once bonds whose central
purpose is local economic protectionism are identified, these bonds can be
excluded from the application of the selective tax system.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF MUNICIPAL BONDS AND THE DORMANT COMMERCE
CLAUSE

A. MUNICIPAL BONDS

Generally, a bond is a confession of debt-a written acknowledgement
that money was borrowed and that it will be repaid with interest. 14 A
municipal bond is a written acknowledgement that a state or local
government borrowed money from a private party and that the citizens of
the state or local government will repay the money with interest. 15 State
and local governments issue or sell municipal bonds to bondholders, and
the citizenry repay the debt with tax revenue. 16 The purpose of this practice

14. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 187 (8th ed. 2004).
15. JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN,
INVESTMENT TERMS 434-35 (6th ed. 2003).
16. AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 6, at 11.

DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND
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is the same as for
collecting taxes: to fulfill the basic civic responsibilities
17
of government.
For state and local governments, the advantage of issuing bonds as
opposed to collecting taxes is threefold. First, by borrowing money, these
governments are able to finance more public work than their current tax
revenues allow. 18 Second, and with regards to long-term public projects,
borrowing the money upfront and paying it back over time defers the cost
of each project to the citizens who benefit. 19 Third, if the money is used to
finance revenue-generating public projects, such as bridges or tunnels, the
revenue can be used to offset the debt. 20 The drawback is, of course,
interest. 21 While state and local governments are able to use the money
almost as soon as the bonds are issued, they must pay the lenders for the
benefit of the use.22 As a result, most states and municipalities issue bonds
to finance long-term public projects and not to meet their immediate
obligations. 23
The next section of this Note examines the shape of the municipal bond
market. Part I.A. 1 explains state and local governments' sources of
authority to issue municipal bonds and the ways in which that authority is
abridged. While state and local governments benefit from the ability to
issue municipal bonds, they are restricted in their ability to do so. 24 The
Federal Constitution, state constitutions, and, to some extent, state statutes
limit state and local governments' freedom to borrow. 25 Part I.A.2
discusses how the federal government and state governments have used tax
laws to manipulate the funding of public projects indirectly through the
municipal bond market. Part I.A.2.a details the federal government's use of
federal tax law, Part I.A.2.b discusses the process and the pitfalls of the
federal government's use of federal tax law, and Part I.A.2.c explains how
state governments have used state tax laws to manipulate the municipal
bond market. Finally, Part I.A.3 discusses the existing municipal bond
market for conduit bonds.

17. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1811 (plurality opinion) (citing United Haulers Ass'n v. OneidaHerkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1795 (2007) (plurality opinion)); Brief

for the National Federation of Municipal Analysts, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither
Party at 4-5, Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (No. 06-666), 2007 WL 2115441 [hereinafter NFMA
Brief].
18. See AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 6, at 11 (finding that local governments

would underfund long-term capital projects if they were required to bear the entire financial
burden immediately upon purchase).
19. Id. at 11-12.
20. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND, supra note 1, at 4.
21. AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 6, at 11.

22. Id.
23. Id. at 10-12.
24. See, e.g., id. at 43-50.
25. See infra Part I.A.1.
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1. The Authority of State and Local Governments To Issue
Municipal Bonds
State and local governments' power to issue municipal bonds derives
from the states' sovereignty, state constitutions, and, in the case of local
governments, state statutes. 2 6 Today, every state in the union has the
authority to issue municipal bonds.2 7 Furthermore, every state has the
authority to delegate authority to its subsidiaries. 28 Thus, via state statute, a
state government may provide authority to a local government to issue
municipal bonds. 29 In addition to empowering state governments to issue
bonds, some state constitutions explicitly limit the authority of the state
government to issue bonds. 30 For instance, some state constitutions limit
the amount of debt that can be issued 31 while others limit the means of
payment.32
State and local governments' power to issue municipal bonds is further
limited by the U.S. Constitution. 33 The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution prevents states from depriving citizens of property without due
process of law. 34 The Supreme Court has found that this limitation applies
directly to taxes and thus indirectly to public debt. 35 Under the Court's
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, state and local governments
may only borrow money if the money is for a public purpose. 36 If the
money is for a private purpose, the bond issuance is an unconstitutional
taking of property without due process of law. 37 As one might imagine, the
test
public/private distinction is very fact specific. 3 8 There is no bright-line
39
purpose.
public
a
have
bonds
municipal
whether
for determining
Perhaps because of the imprecise nature of this determination, the
requirement that state municipal bonds have a public purpose has been
applied neither strictly 40 nor universally. 4 1 State courts have given a very
26. 64 AM JUR. 2D Public Securities and Obligations §§ 36-38, 50 (2008).
27. Id. § 36.
28. Id. § 50.

29. Id.
30. Id. § 40.
31. Id. § 41.
32. Id. § 43.
33. Id. § 39.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ...

deprive any person of...

property, without due process of law .... ").
35. Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 238-39 (1920).
36. Id. at 238.
37. Green, 253 U.S. at 238.
38. Weber v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 990 P.2d 611, 614 (Alaska 1999); 64 AM. JuR.
2D Public Securities and Obligations § 95 (2008) (citing Green, 253 U.S. at 233).
39. Citizens' Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. City of Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 664 (1874);
see also Weber, 990 P.2d at 614 ("[T]here are no rigid categories establishing public versus
private purposes; in each case, the analysis of public purpose must be made within the
context of specific facts." (citing DeArmond v. Alaska State Dev. Corp., 376 P.2d 717, 721
(Alaska 1962))).
40. See Brown v. Longiotti, 420 So. 2d 71, 72 (Ala. 1982) ("[T]he trend among modem
courts is to give the term 'public purpose' a broad expansive definition." (citing Opinion of
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broad reading to the public purpose requirement. 4 2 Part of this broad
reading is attributable to a desire to meet the evolving needs of the public. 43
Simultaneously, different state courts have developed different tests for
determining whether funds are used for a private purpose. 44 At the same
time, at least one court has reinterpreted its earlier test to identify additional
prongs and thereby expand its purview. 4 5 Perhaps the most expansiveand at the same time, prescient-statement of purpose appeared in a case in
Wisconsin in the late 1960s:
[T]he concept of public purpose is a fluid one and varies from time to
time, from age to age, as the government and its people change.
Essentially, public purpose depends upon what the people expect and
want their government to do for the society as a whole and in this growth
46
of expectation, that which often starts as hope ends as entitlement.

the Justices, 384 So. 2d 1051, 1053 (Ala. 1980))); Times of Trenton Publ'g Corp. v.
Lafayette Yard Cmty. Dev. Corp., 846 A.2d 659, 667 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) ("The
concept of public purpose is a broad one."); Town of Beloit v. County of Rock, 657 N.W.2d
344, 353 (Wis. 2003) ("[T]he public purpose doctrine has been broadly interpreted.").
41. Different states have developed different tests to determine whether or not a bond
issuance has a public purpose. See, e.g., Moschenross v. St. Louis County, 188 S.W.3d 13,
22 (Mo. 2006) (applying the "primary effect[s]" test); WDW Props. v. City of Sumter, 535
S.E.2d 631, 635-36 (S.C. 2000) (applying a four-part test); State ex rel. Wis. Dev. Auth. v.
Dammann, 280 N.W. 698, 709 (Wis. 1938) (adopting a two-prong test requiring that the
purpose be (1) of public necessity, convenience, or welfare and (2) for an expenditure that is
difficult for individuals to provide for themselves).
42. Marshall Field & Co. v. Vill. of S. Barrington, 415 N.E.2d 1277, 1282 (I11.1981)
("The consensus of modem legislative and judicial thinking is to broaden the scope of
activities which may be classified as involving a public purpose, especially in the area of
economic welfare." (citing People ex reL City of Salem v. McMackin, 291 N.E.2d 807 (I11.
1972))); see also Times of Trenton, 846 A.2d at 667-69 (applying a broad reading of the
public purpose doctrine); Bryant v. City of Atlantic City, 707 A.2d 1072, 1080 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1998) (same).
43. Times of Trenton, 846 A.2d at 668 (citing Roe v. Kervick, 199 A.2d 834, 850-51
(N.J. 1964)); 15 EUGENE MCQUILLIN ET AL., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 39:25

(3d ed. 2008) ("[I]t has been recognized that 'public purpose' should be broadly construed to
comport with the changing conditions of modem life."); see also State ex rel. Warren v.
Reuter, 170 N.W.2d 790, 795 (Wis. 1969) (finding the concept of public purpose to be both
fluid and contingent on the expectations of society).
44. See, e.g., Moschenross, 188 S.W.3d at 22 (applying the "primary effect[s] test" to
determine if the primary intent of the public expenditure is to serve a public purpose or
promote a private end); Guenzel-Handlos v. County of Lancaster, 655 N.W.2d 384, 389-90
(Neb. 2003) (limiting the inquiry to the pronouncements of the legislature); WDW Props.,
535 S.E.2d at 635-36 (applying a four-part test that requires the court to determine (1) the
ultimate benefit to the public intended by the project, (2) whether public or private parties
will be the primary beneficiaries, (3) the speculative nature of the project, and (4) the
probability that the public interest will be served and the degree to which the public interest
will be served).
45. Compare Dammann, 280 N.W. at 709 (adopting a two-prong test requiring that
purpose be (1) of public necessity, convenience, or welfare and (2) for an expenditure that is
difficult for individuals to provide for themselves), with Beloit, 657 N.W.2d at 350
(identifying the earlier test as a "firmly accepted ... basic constitutional tenant," but adding
an inquiry into the remoteness and the primary purpose of the public benefit).
46. Warren, 170 N.W.2d at 795.
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Several courts have even identified economic development as a
legitimate public purpose for which public funds may be expended. 47
Within the past decade, courts have validated bond issuances for the benefit
of commercial office and retail space in a blighted area; 48 of Busch
Stadium, home ballpark of the St. Louis Cardinals; 49 and of a WalMart
Supercenter. 50 While not all quarters are pushing towards the most lenient
interpretation of the public purpose clause, 5 1 at present, it is unclear
whether or not the Federal Constitution provides any barrier to the ability of
state and local governments to issue municipal bonds as long as the purpose
52
for issuing a bond is arguably public.
Part I.A.2 of this Note explains how Federal and state tax laws affect the
use and utility of municipal bonds. While tax laws do not directly limit the
ability of state and municipal governments to issue municipal bonds, both
state and federal tax laws play a large role in shaping the municipal bonds
market. Such laws influence the types of public projects that are funded by
bonds, the incidence of such issuances, and the behavior of bondholders
who purchase the bonds. 53
2. How Federal and State Governments Have Utilized the Tax Law To
Influence Funding of Public Projects
On a basic level, both the federal government and the state governments
use the tax law to influence the municipal bond market in the same wayby exempting the income earned on municipal bonds from personal income
tax. 54 Under these exemptions, the municipal bondholder does not have to
pay income tax on the interest derived from the bonds. 55 Often the state
and federal subsidy works in concert so that the purchaser's post-tax yield
is increased by the taxable rate that would have otherwise been paid.56

47. 15 MCQUILLIN, supra note 43, § 39:25.
48. WDWProps., 535 S.E.2d at 635-36.
49. Moschenross, 188 S.W.3d at 22.
50. Bd. of Dirs. of Indus. Dev. Bd. v. Taxpayers, 848 So. 2d 740, 748, 750 (La. Ct. App.
2003).
51. See, e.g., Brown v. Longiotti, 420 So. 2d 71, 75 (Ala. 1982) (concluding that bond
sale would primarily benefit individual lessee and thus not serve a significant public
purpose); State v. City of Orlando, 576 So. 2d 1315, 1317 (Fla. 1991) (concluding that
borrowing money for the primary purpose of reinvestment into additional debt instruments is
not a valid public purpose); Hart H. Spiegel, FinancingPrivate Ventures with Tax-Exempt
Bonds: A Developing "Truckhole" in the Tax Law, 17 STAN. L. REv. 224, 240 (1965)

(faulting the Internal Revenue Service for not applying the "business purpose" test to taxexempt bonds).
52. See, e.g., State ex rel. Warren v. Reuter, 170 N.W.2d 790, 795 (Wis. 1969).
53. See infra Part I.A.2.

54. Compare I.R.C. § 103(a) (2006), with KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.010(10), (11)
(LexisNexis 2006).
55. Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1806-07 (2008) (plurality opinion);
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND, supra note 1, at 2.

56. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1805 (plurality opinion).
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To illustrate this point, assume there are two bonds-a corporate bond
and municipal bond-and assume that each bond has an equal rate of
interest and a comparable risk. Because taxes on income from municipal
bonds are exempted from federal income tax, the municipal bond has a
greater post-tax yield than the corporate bond. In this example, the
purchaser collects a windfall. Now, assume that the municipality offers a
lesser rate of interest than the corporate bonds. If the difference between
the rates is offset correctly, the market will be indifferent to the pre-tax
interest rate and the municipality will pay less for its debt. 57 This post-tax
saving induces buyers to accept a lower interest rate and lowers the cost of
58
raising capital for state and local governments.
At closer examination, however, the federal government and the state
governments use their tax laws very differently, both in application and in
underlying purpose. The next section of this Note examines the differences
between these two systems.
a. Federal Use of the Tax Law
The federal government encourages state and local governments to issue
59
municipal bonds by exempting municipal bonds from federal taxation.
Under this exemption, the municipal bondholder does 60not have to pay
federal income tax on the interest derived from the bonds.
This exemption has several consequences. First, "[b]ecause interest
income on the bonds is excluded from gross income, the [holder] is willing
to accept a lower rate on the bonds than he might otherwise accept on a
taxable investment. '' 6 1 Second, because the bondholder is willing to accept
a lower rate of investment, issuers are able to borrow at a lower interest
rate, 62 and the cost of raising capital for state and local governments is
lowered. 6 3 Finally, this subsidy, which accrues to the state and local bond

57. There is a great deal of literature challenging this assertion. See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND, supra note 1, at 4-8. However, the stated assertion is
the "ostensible reason for this regime." Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1805 (plurality opinion).
58.

MICHAEL J. GRAETZ

&

DEBORAH H.

SCHENK,

FEDERAL

INCOME TAXATION:

PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 215 (5th ed. 2005).
59. I.R.C. § 103(a) (2006) ("Except as provided in subsection (b), gross income does not
include interest on any State or local bond.").
60. NFMA Brief, supra note 17, at 5.
61. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND, supra note 1, at 4.
62. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 58, at 215.
63. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND, supra note 1, at 4-5. Experts

argue whether this exemption actually lowers the cost of raising capital. See id. at 7-8
(determining that the federal tax exemption is a source of inefficiency). However, the
argument that the exemption does lower the cost of raising capital is the accepted rationale
for the exemption. Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1805 (2008) (plurality

opinion) ("I he ostensible reason for this regime is the attractiveness of tax-exempt bonds at
'lower rates of interest ...than that paid on taxable ...bonds of comparable risk."' (quoting

GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 58, at 215)).
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issuers through the tax benefit to the bondholders, operates at the expense
of the federal government. 64
While the federal government ultimately bears the cost of this exemption,
it gains a foothold in the municipal bond market. 65 By setting the
parameters for the federal tax exemption, the federal government can
influence the purchases of bondholders; by influencing these purchases, the
federal government influences the type of projects state and local
governments fund. 6 6 To illustrate, the federal tax exemption includes three
major exceptions. 67 These exceptions include unregistered bonds, 6 8 which
curb bondholder tax evasion by requiring ownership transfers to be
recorded on a central list; 69 arbitrage bonds, 70 which prevent issuers from
reinvesting bond proceeds at a materially higher yield than the yield on the
borrowings; 7 1 and unqualified private-activity bonds, 72 which hinder
issuers from financing nongovernmental operations and services. 73 By
barring these types of bonds from the subsidy, the74 federal government
funnels money toward more desirable public projects.
Of the major exceptions, only one has a complicated history: unqualified
private-activity bonds. 75 Private-activity bonds are municipal bonds that
finance nongovernmental entities or persons. 76 In many ways, this carveout
targets the type of bonds targeted by the public/private distinction. 77 The
64. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND, supra note 1, at 4-5 ("[The]
implicit Federal subsidy [is] equal to the difference between the tax-exempt interest rate paid
and the taxable rate that otherwise would be paid.").
65. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND, supra note 1, at 2.
66. Id.
67. I.R.C. § 103(b) (2006). These exceptions were not in place from the earliest days of
the exemption; rather, they came about over time in response to major abuses. See, e.g.,
South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 508-09 (1988) (explaining how the exclusion of
unregistered bonds was developed in response to the "growing magnitude of tax evasion");
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX

REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 1154-55 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter STAFF OF JOINT COMM.
ON TAXATION, ACT OF 1986] (detailing past abuses of arbitrage bonds and determining that

they "have no economic substance, but are made profitable solely through the ability to
borrow at tax-exempt rates").
68. I.R.C. § 103(b)(3).
69. Baker, 485 U.S. at 508.
70. I.R.C. § 103(b)(2).
71. Michael S. Knoll, The UBIT: Leveling an Uneven Playing Field or Tilting a Level
One?, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 857, 890 (2007).
72. I.R.C. § 103(b)(1). The statute actually refers to private-activity bonds that are not
qualified. See id. For convenience, this Note refers to these bonds as "unqualified."
73. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND, supra note 1, at 28-36
(discussing the tests for determining which private-activity bonds do not qualify for tax
exemption, including an assessment of private business use). Note that while the exception
for unqualified private-activity bonds constrains issuers from financing nongovernmental
services and operations, it does not bar them from doing so. See id.
74. Seeid. at28-31.
75. See id. at 12-20 (discussing the history of private-activity bonds).
76. Id. at 2.
77. Compare Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 238-39 (1920) (finding that states may not
tax for merely private purposes), with I.R.C. § 141 (identifying those purposes which are
sufficiently private so as to invoke the federal subsidy).
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difference, however, is that the federal government has a say in where the
line is drawn. 78 The next section of this Note identifies the process of the
federal tax subsidy as well as the pitfalls.
b. The Process and the Pitfalls of the Federal Tax Subsidy
The federal tax subsidy for state and local bonds provides a system for
distinguishing bonds that are eligible for the federal tax subsidy from bonds
that are not. 7 9 Under the terminology of the statute, bonds that are eligible
for the federal tax subsidy are governmental bonds; bonds that are not
eligible are private-activity bonds.80
Private-activity bonds are defined by the use of bond proceeds and the
manner in which the bonds are secured. 8 1 The code provides that a
municipal bond is a "private activity bond" if it meets one of two tests: (1)
the "private loan financing test," 82 or (2) the combination of the "private
84
business use test" 83 and the "private security or payment test"
(collectively the "private business test"). 85 The Internal Revenue Code
does not directly define governmental bonds; governmental bonds are
simply bonds that fail the tests for private-activity bonds. 86 The private
loan financing test is satisfied if more than $5 million or five percent of the
87
proceeds of a bond issuance are used to finance a private loan.
Alternately, if the proceeds of a bond issuance are used to finance a private
loan, the issuance could evade classification as a private-activity bond if the
private loan represents less than five percent of the total proceeds of the
bond issuance and the private loan is less than $5 million. 88 For example, a
municipal bond issuance that includes a $4.9 million loan to a private party

78. See I.R.C. § 141.
79. Id.; STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND, supra note 1,at 28-36.
80. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND, supra note 1, at 21.

This

distinction isdefined entirely within the federal tax code. Id. To the extent that state codes
recognize private-activity bonds, they either cross-reference the Internal Revenue Code or
fail to define private-activity bonds and thereby tacitly accept the definition provided in the
Federal Tax Code. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 41-10-36(12) (LexisNexis 2000) ("[Private-

activity bond] has the same meaning as that specified for such term in Section 141(a) of the
code."); ALASKA STAT. § 37.15.800(e)(1) (2008) ("'[P]rivate activity bond' means a bond
described in [I.R.C. § 141] ....");ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-5-207(b)(32) (Supp. 2009) (cross-

referencing I.R.C. § 146 for definition of private-activity bonds); COLO. REV.STAT. § 24-321703(2) (2008) (same); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 3-20(x) (West 2007) (same).
81. See I.R.C. § 141; see also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND,

supra note 1, at 28-29 (explaining private-activity bond tests).
82. I.R.C. § 141(a)(2), (c).
83. Id.§ 141(a)(1)(A), (b)(l).
84. Id.§ 141(a)(1)(B), (b)(2).
85. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND, supra note 1, at 28-29
(identifying the "private business test").
86. Id. at 28 ("The Code ...does not define a governmental bond, but rather defines an
impermissible private activity bond, i.e., a bond that is not a governmental bond.").
87. I.R.C. § 141(c)(1).

88. Id.
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will be classified as a governmental bond if the total value of the bond
issuance is $100 million.
The private business test includes both the private business use test and
the private security or payment test. 89 While the two subelements of the
private business test are also called tests, they are more properly understood
as prongs. A bond meets the requirements of the first prong, the private
business use test, if more than ten percent of the total proceeds of the issue
will be used for a private business use. 90 A bond meets the requirement of
the second prong, the private security or payment test, if more than ten
percent of the principal, or ten percent of the interest on the proceeds of the
bonds, is secured by an interest in private property or paid for with private
funds. 9 1 If a bond issuance fails either prong, the obligation is, at least by
definition, a "standard" governmental bond. 92 Thus, under the private
business use test, a private facility may be financed with governmental
bonds, provided that bonds are neither secured by nor paid for with private
payments.
While a debt obligation may be structured to transform what is properly
understood as a private-activity bond into a government bond, this
metamorphosis exists mostly on paper. 9 3 Whether or not a bond is a
private-activity bond is not an accurate indicator of whether the bond has a
public or private purpose. A bond issuance could be either a privateactivity bond or a governmental bond depending on how its debt is
structured. 94 Also, the types of bonds that are eligible for the federal tax
subsidy are subject to frequent legislative adjustment. 95
The landscape of private-activity bonds is further complicated by the
existence of qualified public-activity bonds. 96 Qualified public-activity
bonds are private-activity bonds that, for various reasons, qualify for federal
tax exemption. 97 For all of these bond issuances, the financing benefits
nongovernmental persons. 9 8 However, the purposes for which qualified
public-activity bonds may be issued include "the cardinal civic
responsibilities" of government. 99 Exempt facilities bonds, for example,
list among their exemptions transport facilities,' 00 basic utilities, 10 1 social

89. Id. § 141(b).
90. Id. § 141(b)(1).
91. Id. § 141(b)(2).
92. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND, supra note 1, at 28.
93. See id. at 21-22.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 17-19 (listing and explaining every act that expanded the list of activities
that are eligible for tax exemption).
96. I.R.C. § 141(e).
97. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND, supra note 1, at 3-4.
98. Id. at 4.
99. Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1811 (2008) (plurality opinion).
100. I.R.C. § 142(a)(1) (airports); id. § 142(a)(2) (docks and wharves); id. § 142(a)(3)
(mass-commuting facilities); id. § 142(a)(1 1) (high-speed intercity rail facilities); id. §
142(a)(1 5) (certain highway or surface freight-transfer facilities).
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housing projects, 10 2 and sustainable development projects. 10 3 Similarly,
04
qualified public-activity bonds include bond issuances for student loans'
05
including the American Red
and qualified 501(c)(3) organizations,'
Cross, 106 Habitat for Humanity, 10 7 the Salvation Army, 108 and the United
Way. 109 Essentially, a substantial portion of these qualified public-activity
bonds fall somewhere in the gray area between public and private. "10
As explained above, the federal government is not the only party that
uses the tax law to manipulate the bond market. State governments have
also created subsidies in order to influence purchasers and decrease the cost
of raising capital. The next section of this Note addresses these laws and
their consequences.
c. State Use of the Tax Law
In most states, in order to qualify for the in-state exemption from state
income tax, the bondholder must purchase the bond from the state or local
government where they reside.I'
In most states that exempt municipal
bonds from state income tax, the bonds issued by sister states or their
municipalities are not exempt from state income tax. 112
101. Id. § 142(a)(4) (facilities for the furnishing of water); id. § 142(a)(5) (sewage
facilities); id. § 142(a)(6) (solid-waste disposal facilities); id. § 142(a)(8) (facilities for the
local furnishing of electric energy or gas); id. § 142(a)(9) (local district heating or cooling
facilities); id. § 142(a)(10) (qualified hazardous-waste facilities).
102. Id. § 142(a)(7).
103. Id. § 142(a)(12) (environmental enhancements of hydroelectric generating facilities);
id. § 142 (a)(13) (qualified public educational facilities); id. § 142 (a)(14) (qualified greenbuilding and sustainable-design projects).
104. Id. § 141(e)(1)(E).
105. Id. § 141(e)(1)(G). The designation 501(c)(3) comes from a statute in the Internal
Revenue Code that provides federal tax exemption for organizations that are operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, or scientific purposes. Id. § 501 (c)(3).
106. American Red Cross Home Page, Donate to the Red Cross, http://www.redcross.org
(follow "Giving and Getting Involved" hyperlink; then follow "Donate" hyperlink) (last
visited Sept. 19, 2009).
107. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-1914868 (Aug. 6, 2004).
Army
Adult
Rehabilitation
Center
Home
Page,
108. The
Salvation
http://www.use.salvationarmy.org (follow "Donations" dropdown menu; then follow "Tax
Information" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 19, 2009).
109. United Way of America, Accountability, http://www.liveunited.org/about/
accountability.cfm (last visited Sept. 19, 2009).
110. It is this private character-applied here to private-activity bonds as defined by
Internal Revenue Code but equally applicable to all conduit bonds-that complicates the
analysis applied to governmental bonds in Davis. See Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct.
1801, 1811 (2008) (plurality opinion) (upholding the state tax exemption because it "favors a
traditional government function without any differential treatment favoring local entities").
111. See NFMA Brief, supra note 17, at 8-10. If the bondholder purchases a municipal
bond from a sister state or municipality, the bondholder must pay state income tax on the
interest derived from the bonds to the state where they reside. Id.
112. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Securities Industry & Financial Markets Ass'n in
Support of Petitioners at 6, Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (No. 06-666) [hereinafter SIFMA Brief]
("[This system] provides for preferential tax treatment of [a State's] own municipal bonds
over the municipal bonds of other States.").
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The reason most states do not extend the exemption to out-of-state bonds
is twofold. First, when a state provides an income tax exemption for instate municipal bonds, that state is attracting in-state purchasers to buy its
debt.1 13 If that state extended its in-state exemption to every state, residents
of that state would have no monetary incentive to differentiate between that
state's bonds and out-of-state bonds. 114 Thus, demand for that state's
municipal bonds would be reduced.' 15 Meanwhile, under the present
system, the residents of every other state retain their incentive to
differentiate and the pool of potential financing for the state that extends the
exemption is significantly reduced. 116 Second, any state that offers
differential tax treatment for municipal bonds does so with the expectation
that, by borrowing at a lower rate, that state will gain more in borrowing
power than it forgoes in taxes. 117 If a state extended the exemption to every
state, that state would effectively subsidize the public projects of its sister
states. 118 Thus, unlike the federal exemption, the state income tax
exemption serves an important limiting function, giving residents an
incentive to differentiate between in-state and extraterritorial municipal
bonds. 119
In the United States, such a discriminatory tax system is ubiquitous. 120
Thirty-seven states employ this system or something substantially
similar. 12 1 Four states employ a comparable tax system that exempts some,
113. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1805-06 (plurality opinion).
114. Id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 58, at 215-16.
118. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1805-06 (plurality opinion).
119. Id.
120. Brief of Alan D. Viard et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 13, Davis,
128 S. Ct. 1801 (No. 06-666) [hereinafter Viard Brief] (referring to this system as "selective
municipal bond tax exemption").
121. ALA. CODE § 40-18-4, -14(3)(f) (LexisNexis 2003); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431021(3) (2006); ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-51-404(b) (1997); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17133
(West 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-22-104(3)(b) (2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12701(a)(20)(A)(i) (West 2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1 106(a)(l) (1997); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 48-7-27(b)(1)(A) (2009); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 39-11, 47-13 (2008); id. § 235-7(a)(6),
(b)(2) (Supp. 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-3022M(1), (3)(b) (2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
79-32,117(b)(i) (Supp. 2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.010(10), (11) (LexisNexis 2006);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 47:48, 47:293(9)(b) (2001 & Supp. 2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
36, § 5122(1)(A) (Supp. 2008); MD. CODE ANN., TAx-GEN. § 10-204(b) (LexisNexis Supp.
2008); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 62, § 2(a)(1)(A) (LexisNexis 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 206.30(1)(a) (West Supp. 2009); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.01(19a)(1)(i) (West 2007);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-7-15(4)(d) (West Supp. 2008); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 143.121(2) (West
Supp. 2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-30-111(2)(a)(i) (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 772716(1)(c) (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 77:4(I) (LexisNexis 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
54A:6-14 (West 2002); N.M. STAT. § 7-2-2(B)(3), -2(V) (2001); N.Y. TAX LAW § 612(b)(1)
(McKinney 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-134.6(b)(1)(b), (c)(1) (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE §
57-38-01.2(1)(g) (Supp. 2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5747.01(A)(1) (LexisNexis 2008);
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 316.680(2)(a) (West 2003); 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 9901 (West 2000);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-30-12(b)(1) (Supp. 2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-1120(1) (2000);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2-104(e)(1) (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5811(18)(A)(i)(II)
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but not all, in-state municipal bonds. 122 Two states offer reciprocal
treatment of municipal bonds. 123 The seven remaining states have no
personal income tax. 24
The result of this ubiquitous system is a very large market for municipal
bonds. Part I.A.3 outlines the current municipal bond market and identifies
some recent trends.
3. The Existing Municipal Bond Market for Conduit Bonds
In 2007, state and local governments sold a record $427.6 billion in
bonds. 125 That year-end total was five percent over the previous record, set
in 2005, and ten percent greater than the previous year's volume. 126 In
2005-2006, the latest period for which census data is available, the Census
Bureau reported $2.2 trillion in outstanding state and local government
debt. 12 7 The majority of bonds issued each year are government bonds,
which are generally used for the cardinal civic responsibilities of
government.' 2 8 Still, the use of tax-exempt bonds by state and local
governments grew to over $2.1 trillion by 2006.129 In 2007, tax revenues
130
lost from such bonds are estimated to be $37 billion.
While not every bond issuance supports industrial development, 13 1 many
municipal bonds in the existing market do. 132 In February 2008, the U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report about the status
(2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-322(B)(1), (C)(2) (Supp. 2007); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-2112(b)(1), (c)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007).
122. 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/203(a)(2)(A) (West 2005 & Supp. 2009); 45 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 35/80(e) (West 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 422.7(36) (West 2006); OKLA. STAT.

ANN. tit. 68, §§ 2358.5, 2358.5A (West Supp. 2009); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 71.05(1)(c) (West
2004).
123. Utah employs the differential tax treatment for municipal bonds and extends
reciprocal treatment to the bonds of states that do not tax Utah bonds. UTAH CODE ANN. §
59-10-114(1)(e), (5) (2008). Indiana exempts all municipal bonds. IND. CODE ANN. § 6-3-13.5 (LexisNexis 2007).
124 These states include Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington,
Wyoming. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1807 n.7 (plurality opinion).
125. Matthew Hanson, Volume at a Record $427.6B, BOND BUYER, Jan. 2, 2008, at 1.
126. Id.
127. U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/govs/estimate/0600ussll.html (last
visited Sept. 19, 2009).
128. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TAX-EXEMPT STATUS OF CERTAIN BONDS
MERITS RECONSIDERATION, AND APPARENT NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ISSUANCE COST
LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED 3-4 (2008); NFMA Brief, supra note 17, at 4-5.

129. Peter Schroeder, GAO: Rethink Tax-Exempts for Private Facilities, BOND BUYER,
Mar. 19, 2008, at 4.
130. Id.
131. For 2007, Bond Buyer indicated that at least sixty percent of all bond issuances
support the bedrock purposes of health, safety, and welfare. Hanson, supra note 125
(determined by adding the 2007 totals for education, electric power, environmental facilities,
health care, public facilities, transportation, and utilities for all bond and note issuances). It
is probable that an even larger percentage of all municipal debt issuances are in furtherance
of the bedrock principles, but it is difficult to prove with the available data. See id.
132. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY

OFFICE,

supra note

128,

governmental bonds "are generally issued for traditional public purposes").

at 3

(finding
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of tax-exempt bonds to the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance. 133 This
report determined that, while "[p]revious legislation prohibited using
qualified private activity bonds for certain facilities. .. many of these types
of facilities are still being financed with tax-exempt governmental
bonds."' 134 Facilities that are essentially private in nature, including sports
stadiums, 135 hotels, 136 and golf courses 137 are being financed with taxexempt governmental bonds. 138
Furthermore, "the broad discretion
afforded to state and local governments allows them to use tax-exempt
governmental bonds to finance facilities and activities that cannot be
financed with private activity bonds."' 139 The GAO ended its report with a
request that Congress consider "whether ... facilities . . . that are privately
used should
continue to be financed with tax-exempt governmental
14 0
bonds."
Despite the request of the GAO, Congress has since raised the federal cap
on private-activity bonds. On July 30, 2008, the Housing and Economic
Recovery Act of 2008 (the Housing Act) 14 1 raised the federal cap on
private-activity bonds by $11 billion. 14 2 The purpose of the Housing Act
was to "respon[d] to the subprime mortgage crisis and mounting
foreclosures." 143 Technically, the portion of the Housing Act that increases
the federal cap on private-activity bonds sunsets in 2008.144 When viewed
in conjunction with a rollover provision that was also adjusted within the
Housing Act, however, the volume cap is actually extended through
2010.145
The increase is also technically limited to qualified housing
issues, 14 6 allowing bonds to "refinance subprime mortgages, provide loans

133. Id.
134. Id. at intro.
135. Id. at 23. The GAO identified almost $4 billion worth of municipal bonds funding
stadiums and arenas with significant private business use in calendar year 2006. Id. at 20.
136. Id. at 29. The GAO identified eighteen large, full-service hotels that were financed
with tax-exempt bonds between 2002 and 2006, several of which were rated three or four
diamond by the American Automobile Association. Id. at 30.
137. Id. at 29. The GAO identified six golf courses that were opened in 2005 and
financed, at least in part, with tax-exempt governmental bond financing. Id. at 30. The GAO
further found that all of these golf courses were "among the better golfing facilities in their
respective regions" including the Arnold Palmer Classic Silver Rock Resort golf course in
La Quinta, California which was financed with over $103 million worth of municipal bonds.
Id. at 32-33.
138. Id. at 30.
139. Id. at 42.
140. Id. at 43.
141. Pub. L. No. 110-289, 2008 U.S.C.C.A.N. (122 Stat.) 2654 (codified in scattered
sections of 12, 15, 26, 37, 38, and 42 U.S.C.).
142. Id. § 3021 (liberalizing the requirements of I.R.C. § 146).
143. Lynn Hume, IRS Releases Data on States' Capacity for Housing Bonds, BOND

BUYER, Sept. 18, 2008, at 4.
144. See I.R.C. § 146(d)(5) (2006) (limiting increase in state ceiling cap to calendar year
2008).
145. Id. § 146(l(6) (extending carryforward for qualified housing issues to 2010); see
also Hume, supra note 143.
146. Id. § 146(d)(5)(B)(i)(7).
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to first-time homebuyers, or finance multifamily housing projects."' 147
Ultimately, however, the cap increase leaves states and local governments
free to allocate the balance of their private-activity bonds without reference
to housing projects. 148
While this market has been allowed to develop unimpeded by its internal
laws, a question remains as to whether or not it violates a separate canon of
constitutional law-the dormant Commerce Clause. Part I.B reviews the
history and purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause.
B. The Dormant Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution expressly grants
Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States ..." 149 From this grant, the Supreme Court has inferred a "negative
implication" that restrains the states from regulating such commerce. 150
This implication has come to be known as the dormant Commerce
Clause. 151

The purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause is "to prohibit state or
municipal laws whose object is local economic protectionism, laws that
would excite those jealousies and retaliatory measures the Constitution was
designed to prevent." 152 If states were allowed to isolate themselves
53
economically, the welfare of the nation as a whole could be jeopardized. 1
Preventing this "economic Balkanization" is the central rationale of the
dormant Commerce Clause today, 154 just as it was a central rationale for
revising the Articles of Confederation. 155 At the same time, the prevention
147. Hume, supra note 143.
148. Id. ("[T]he housing finance agencies can use the extra housing bond capacity in any
order, before or after, they issue other bonds allocated under the PAB volume cap.
Normally, they would have to use the oldest allocated bonds first.").
149. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
150. Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1808 (2008) (plurality opinion).
Judicial acknowledgement of the exclusive nature of the Commerce Clause dates to the first
major case to parse the Commerce Clause. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 236
(1824) (Johnson, J., concurring) ("The inferences... appear to me to be altogether in favour
of the exclusive grants to Congress of power over commerce ....
.").
151. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1808 (plurality opinion). The first reference to the dormant
aspect of the Commerce Clause was by Chief Justice John Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden. 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 189 ("The [Commerce Clause power] ... must be placed in the hands of
agents, or lie dormant."); see also Steven Breker-Cooper, The Commerce Clause: The Case
for JudicialNon-Intervention, 69 OR. L. REV. 895, 896 n.9 (1990) (identifying Marshall's
use of the term "dormant" in Gibbons and tracing it to Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh
Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829) ("We do not think that the [ordinance] can ... be
considered as repugnant to the power to regulate commerce in its dormant state.
(emphasis added)).
152. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994).
153. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 180 (1995).
154. Davis, 128 S.Ct. at 1808 (plurality opinion) (citing "'economic protectionism"' as
the primary concern of the modem dormant Commerce Clause (quoting New Energy Co. of
Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988))).
155. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979) ("[A] central concern of the
Framers that was an immediate reason for calling the Constitutional Convention... [was] to
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of economic isolation is not the sole concern of the Constitution.1 56 Thus, a
tension exists between the dormant Commerce Clause and the federal
system's preference for local autonomy. 15 7 The dormant Commerce Clause
acts to prevent economic seclusion, subject to every state's right to
58

sovereignty. 1

The Commerce Clause is not an exclusive grant of power to the
legislature; 159 therefore, the dormant Commerce Clause does not forbid
states from affecting any aspect of interstate commerce. 160 There are
arenas where, in the absence of a conflicting federal statute, 161 states may
regulate interstate commerce. 162 For example, states and local governments
may regulate government functions that are truly local. 163 Such functions,
like port pilotage 164 and crabbing on the high seas, are better served by
local regulation; uniform federal regulation would be impractical. 165 Where
states may not regulate commerce, however, is where such regulation

avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the
Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation."); see also THE
FEDERALIST No. 22, at 110 (Alexander Hamilton) (rev. ed., The Colonial Press 1901)
(arguing that a primary defect of the federal system at that time was the lack of "federal
superintendence" of interstate commerce).
156. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1808 (plurality opinion).
157. Compare THE FEDERALIST Nos. 7, 11 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 155, at 2931 (arguing that the power to regulate commerce should reside in a central government as a
barricade against disunity), and THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison), supra note 155, at
241-42 (same), with THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 155, at 289-90
(arguing that power should be separated between the states and the central government as a
bulwark against tyranny).
158. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1808 (plurality opinion) ("[T]he Framers' distrust of
economic Balkanization was limited by their federalism favoring a degree of local
autonomy."); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985) ("The
essence of our federal system is that within the realm of authority left open to them under the
Constitution, the States must be equally free to engage in any activity that their citizens
choose for the common weal .. ").
159. The Supreme Court determined early on that the Commerce Clause power is not
wholly exclusive. See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298, 319 (1851);
Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829).
160. Ernest A. Young, DualFederalism, ConcurrentJurisdiction,and the ForeignAffairs
Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 139, 139 (2001) ("By 1950, . . . the Court switched to a
regime of concurrent regulatory jurisdiction, with state regulatory authority existing absent
discrimination or a clear statement of preemptive congressional intent ....").
161. Breker-Cooper, supra note 151, at 895 ("There has never been any serious doubt that
if Congress chose to regulate interstate commerce, any inconsistent state regulation would be
invalidated by virtue of the supremacy clause." (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2)).
162. See, e.g., S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185 (1938); see
also United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786,
1796 (2007) (plurality opinion) (allowing flow-control ordinances for solid waste); Cooley,
53 U.S. (12 How.) at 313-14 (allowing governance to occur at the local level where uniform
regulation would be impractical).
163. Cooley, 53 U.S (12 How.) at 313-14.
164. The Carrie L. Tyler, 106 F. 422, 424 (4th Cir. 1901).
165. State v. Bundrant, 546 P.2d 530, 538-39 (Alaska 1976).
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encumbers interstate commerce. 166 The dormant Commerce Clause is
concerned with "economic protectionism-that is, regulatory measures
designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state
competitors." 167 Accordingly, the dormant Commerce Clause is limited to
the prevention of state regulation that discriminates against 168 or
improperly burdens interstate commerce. 169
Part I.B. 1 begins with a review of the standard dormant Commerce
Clause analysis the Supreme Court has developed to determine whether an
ordinance violates the Commerce Clause. Part I.B.2 addresses the market
participation exception to the dormant Commerce Clause analysis-an
exception that allows states to favor their own citizens without violating the
dormant Commerce Clause, when acting in the marketplace as a market
participant. Part I.B.3 discusses the government entity exception to the
dormant Commerce Clause analysis-a newly recognized exception that
allows states to provide economic protection for government entities
without violating the dormant Commerce Clause. Finally, Part I.B.4
discusses discriminatory tax practices to emphasize that such practices are
subject to the same analysis as any other discriminatory law.
1. Standard Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis
To determine whether an ordinance affecting interstate commerce
violates the Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court has developed two lines
of analysis. 170 First, where a statute discriminates against interstate
commerce, the law is "virtually per se invalid." 171 Second, where a statute
does not discriminate against interstate commerce, the statute "will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."' 172 The separation
between these lines of analysis is not complete, 173 and the Court has
74
identified some common ground at the margins. 1
166. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994) ("[The]
'negative' aspect [of the Commerce Clause] ... denies the States the power unjustifiably to
discriminate against or burden the interstate flow of articles of commerce.").
167. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988).
168. Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99 ("If a restriction on commerce is discriminatory, it is
virtually per se invalid." (citing Chem. Waste Mgmt. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 344 n.6 (1992);
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978))).

169. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) ("Where the statute regulates
even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." (citing Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960))).

170. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994).
171. Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99; see also City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 624.
172. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (citing Huron, 362 U.S. at 443).
173. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298 n.12 (1997) ("There is ... no clear

line between these two strands of analysis ....

" (citing Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v.

N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986))).

174. Id. (noting cases where the Court applied one line of analysis while relying on the
other line of analysis).
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Under the first line of analysis, a statute discriminates against commerce
when it treats in-state and out-of-state economic interests differently, to the
benefit of the former and the burden of the latter. 175 Under this analysis,
incidental effects on the free flow of commerce are not enough to render a
statute discriminatory. 176 The fundamental purpose of the ordinance must
be to protect in-state markets from out-of-state markets.' 77 If that is the
case-even if the underlying goal is legitimate-the ordinance is
discriminatory. 178 The archetypical discriminatory law cordons commerce
179
within the state.
However, discriminatory statutes are not automatically invalid.180 If a
statute is found to be discriminatory, it is merely presumed to be invalid. 18'
Such statutes can survive this presumption of invalidity if they "advance[] a
legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable
Regardless, the standard for
nondiscriminatory alternatives." 182
overcoming the presumption is very high. 183 "At a minimum such facial
discrimination invokes the strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate
84
local purpose and of the absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives." 1
The second line of analysis addresses statutes that do not discriminate
against interstate commerce.' 85 Where a statute does not discriminate
against interstate commerce, the statute "will be upheld unless the burden
imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits."' 186 This examination, adopted in Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc.187 and commonly referred to as the Pike test, 188 is a cost175. Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99.
176. Id. (citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979)).
177. See Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342 (1992).
178. See, e.g., id. (holding a surcharge on out-of-state hazardous waste enacted for
environmental benefit to be discriminatory); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511,
522-24 (1935) (holding a statute preventing sale of out-of-state milk below in-state price
floor for public health purpose to be discriminatory).
179. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) ("In determining whether a State has
overstepped its role in regulating interstate commerce, this Court has distinguished between
state statutes that burden interstate transactions only incidentally, and those that affirmatively
discriminate against such transactions.").
180. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988).
181. See id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979).
185. But see Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making
Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1283-84 (1986) (arguing
that cases decided under the second line of analysis are actually invalid because of their
discriminatory character).
186. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citing Huron Portland Cement
Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)).
187. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
188. See, e.g., James D. Fox, State Benefits Under the Pike Balancing Test of the
Dormant Commerce Clause: Putative or Actual?, I AVE MARIA L. REv. 175, 175 (2003)
(referring to the inquiry as the "Pike balancing test"). Note that the Court does not
consistently apply the same term for this test. See Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct.
1801, 1808, 1817-18 (2008) (plurality opinion) (referring to the Pike test as, alternately,
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benefit analysis. 189 It applies to laws that are directed at legitimate local
190
concerns that have only an incidental effect upon interstate commerce.
Under the Pike test, a court first looks for a legitimate purpose and then
measures the degree of benefit that the statute provides.19 1 Next, the court
examines the burden.1 92 "[T]he extent of the burden that will be tolerated
will.., depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether
activities." 193
it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate194
This is a low-threshold analysis; thus, laws normally survive.
There is no bright line separating "the category of state regulation that is
virtually per se invalid under the Commerce Clause, and the category
subject to the Pike balancing approach." 19 5 Some academics have argued
that this lack of distinction belies the illusory nature of the Pike balancing
test. 19 6 Whether or not the Pike test is actually illusory and the Court is
merely "suppressing protectionism" while claiming to apply it, 19 7 the Court

"Pike scrutiny," "Pike enquiry," "Pike balancing," "Pike examination," "Pike burden," and
"Pike comparison"); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298 n.12 (1997) (referring
to it as the "undue burden test").
189. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1817 (plurality opinion); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (1970).
190. Davis, 128 S.Ct. at 1817 (plurality opinion); City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 624;
Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
191. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. The Pike test has also been framed as a three-prong inquiry.
See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) ("Under [the Pike test], we must inquire
(1) whether the challenged statute regulates evenhandedly with only 'incidental' effects on
interstate commerce, or discriminates against interstate commerce either on its face or in
practical effect; (2) whether the statute serves a legitimate local purpose; and, if so, (3)
whether alternative means could promote this local purpose as well without discriminating
against interstate commerce."). It is unclear whether this formulation is substantially
different from the application outlined in Pike itself.
192. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
193. Id.
194. See, e.g., Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 489 U.S. 493, 525-26
(1989); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981).
195. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579
(1986).
196. See Fox, supra note 188, at 213 (finding the Pike balancing test to be "ad-hoc" and
"case-by-case" rather than a disciplined approach); Regan, supra note 185, at 1284-87
(finding the Pike test to be a general avenue to "suppress[] protectionism" as opposed to an
actual balancing test). Many of these complaints stem from the difficulty courts have
weighing the benefits and burdens of legislation and balancing the values against each other.
See Fox, supra note 188, at 189. Justice Scalia has likened this process to "judging whether
a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy," Bendix Autolite Corp. v.
Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring), and has repeatedly
expressed the belief that the balancing of the benefits and burdens of legislation is better left
to the legislature. See Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1821 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Bendix Autolite, 486 U.S. at 895-98 (Scalia, J., concurring). Despite such
criticisms, courts have continued to use the Pike analysis. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Tex.
Dep't of Transp., 264 F.3d 493, 503 (5th Cir. 2001); U & I Sanitation v. City of Columbus,
205 F.3d 1063, 1070 (8th Cir. 2000); Ass'n of Int'l Auto. Mfrs. v. Abrams, 84 F.3d 602,
612-13 (2d Cir. 1996).
197. Regan, supra note 185, at 1284-87.
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has continued to employ Pike, 198 at least in those cases where they are
99
institutionally suited to do so. 1

2. Market Participation Exception
The Court has recognized a fundamental difference between market
regulation and market participation. 200 The Commerce Clause is directed at

market regulation 20 1 and, by extension, so is the dormant Commerce

Clause.2 0 2 Market participation, however, exists outside of the realm of
market regulation. 203 The Commerce Clause was designed to break down

trade barriers among the states; 20 4 it was not intended to regulate state and
205
local governments when they are participating in the marketplace.
To address this difference, the Court developed an exception to the

standard Commerce Clause analysis for states "that go beyond regulation
and themselves 'participat[e] in the market' so as to 'exercis[e] the right to
favor [their] own citizens over others."' 206 Under the market participant
doctrine, states may favor their own citizens when buying or selling goods
or services without violating the dormant Commerce Clause. 20 7 This
exception constitutes "a single inquiry: whether the challenged 'program

constitute[s] direct state participation in the market."'

208

Conflicts arising

under the market participation exception focus on whether the state action
20 9
constitutes regulation or participation in the marketplace.

198. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct.
1786, 1797-98 (2007) (plurality opinion) (applying the Pike test).
199. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1817-19 (plurality opinion) (determining that the judicial branch
was not institutionally suited to perform a Pike test on the differential tax scheme); see also
Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 342 (1996) (.'[C]ourts as institutions are poorly
equipped to evaluate with precision the relative burdens of various methods of taxation. The
complexities of factual economic proof always present a certain potential for error, and
courts have little familiarity with the process of evaluating the relative economic burden of
taxes."' (quoting Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 589-90 (1983))).
200. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 807-10 (1976).
201. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power To . . . regulate
Commerce... among the several States .... ").
202. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1808 (plurality opinion) ("[A]lthough its terms do not expressly
restrain 'the several States' in any way, we have sensed a negative implication in the
provision since the early days .... ").
203. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 (1980); see also Hughes, 426 U.S. at 810
("Nothing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence
of congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its
own citizens over others.").
204. Hughes, 426 U.S. at 807; H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 53335(1949).
205. White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 208 (1983).
206. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1809 (plurality opinion) (quoting Hughes, 426 U.S. at 810).
207. David S. Bogen, The Market ParticipantDoctrine and the Clear Statement Rule, 29
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 543, 543 (2006).
208. White, 460 U.S. at 208 (quoting Reeves, 447 U.S. at 436 n.7).
209. See, e.g., Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1811-14 (plurality opinion); White, 460 U.S. at 20910.
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In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,21° the Supreme Court found that
the State of Maryland had participated in the market for abandoned
automobiles when it provided a bounty to licensed scrap processors for the
destruction of any vehicle previously titled in Maryland. 2 11 The State
created the bounty to alleviate its aesthetic problem of abandoned
vehicles. 2 12 In an attempt to limit this bounty to vehicles abandoned in
Maryland, the State required non-Maryland scrap processors to provide
additional documentation in order to collect. 2 13 Although this additional
documentation was ostensibly a protection for automobile owners against
unlawful conversion, the Court recognized that the documentation
requirements were an encumbrance on the free transfer of such vehicles 2 14
and hampered the free flow of such vehicles across state lines. 2 15
Regardless, the Court determined that the Maryland statute was not the kind
of law the Commerce Clause was designed to prevent. 2 16 By bidding up
the price of abandoned automobiles, the State entered the market as a
purchaser. 2 17 When acting as a purchaser, any state is able to "restrict[] its
trade to its own citizens or businesses. "218 "Nothing in the purposes
animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of
congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the
right to favor its own citizens over others. ' '2 19 In Hughes, Maryland did not
interfere with the integrity of the market; it participated in it. 220
Similarly, the Court in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake22 1 found that South Dakota
acted as a market participant when, in a time of shortage, it restricted the
sale of cement produced at a state-owned plant to South Dakotans. 222 The
state-owned plant was originally built for the sole benefit of South
Dakotans during an earlier time of shortage. 223 Over the years, however,
the plant produced more cement than the people could use and the plant
began selling to out-of-state purchasers. 2 24 In 1978, demand far outpaced
210. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
211. Id. at 813-14.

212. Id. at 796. By rewarding scrap processors for destroying abandoned vehicles,
Maryland incentivized the delivery of such vehicles and thereby sped its scrap cycle. Id. at
797.
213. Id. at 800-01. The additional documentation requirement, which was actually an
amendment to the original statute, only applied to one category of abandoned automobiles,
hulks (automobiles over eight years old that are inoperable). Hughes, 426 U.S. at 798, 80001; see MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 25-210(b) (LexisNexis 2009). At the time, hulks
accounted for ninety-six percent of the market. Hughes, 426 U.S. at 800-01.
214. Hughes, 426 U.S. at 798.
215. Id. at 805.
216. Id.

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 808.
Id.
Id. at 810 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 806.
447 U.S. 429 (1980).
Id. at 447 (Powell, J., dissenting).

223. Id. at 430-33 (majority opinion).

224. Id. at 432 ("Between 1970 and 1977, some 40% of the plant's output went outside
the State.").
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production and the plant returned to its earlier policy of serving South
Dakota customers first. 225 Reeves, Inc., an out-of-state ready-mix concrete
distributor that was forced to cut production by seventy-six percent as a
result of the resident-preference policy, brought suit against South Dakota
226
for hoarding its resources in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.
The Court ultimately determined that the State was not hoarding its
resources but was acting as a trader/manufacturer. 22 7 In its capacity as a
trader/manufacturer, the Court determined that, "when acting as proprietors,
States should . . . share existing freedoms from federal constraints,

'228
including the inherent limits of the Commerce Clause.
Conversely, the Court did not find that Alaska acted as a market
229
participant in South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke.
There, Alaska, under a special provision of a contract to sell timber,
required purchasers to partially process the purchased timber in-state. 230
The state argued that the provision was indistinguishable from the subsidy
in Alexandria Scrap.23 1 The Court held otherwise: "when Maryland
became involved in the scrap market it was as a purchaser of scrap; Alaska,
on the other hand, participates in the timber market, but imposes conditions
downstream in the timber-processing market. ' 232 The difference between
directly subsidizing Alaskan timber processing and forcing buyers to
employ such processing as a condition for purchase distinguished the
practices. 2 33 Fearful that the market participation exception would swallow
the entire rule, the Court determined that "[t]he State may not impose
conditions, whether by statute, regulation, or contract, that have a
substantial regulatory effect outside of [the] particular market [in which
they are participating]. ' 234 In doing so, the Court formally rejected the
argument that a state may act as a market regulator when the same end
235
could have been achieved by the state as a market participant.

225. Id.
226. Id. at 433. States may not hoard their resources under the guise of preserving them.
See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 338 (1979) (invalidating Oklahoma law preventing
commercial exportation of minnows born in natural streams); City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978) (invalidating New Jersey statute conserving landfill space
for benefit of residents); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1928)
(invalidating Louisiana act forbidding interstate transportation of shrimp before in-state
processing).
227. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 440 ("South Dakota, as a seller of cement, unquestionably fits
the 'market participant' label more comfortably than a State acting to subsidize local scrap
processors.").
228. Id. 438-39.
229. 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
230. Id. at 99.
231. Id. at 95.

232.
233.
234.
235.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 97.
Id. at 98-99.
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3. Government Entity Exception
The Court has also recognized a fundamental difference between
economic protection of a private entity and economic protection of a
government entity. 2 36 Economic protection of government entities is not
susceptible to standard Commerce Clause scrutiny. 237 The Court based this
decision on its determination that laws favoring states and municipalities
are presumptively aimed at legitimate goals completely unrelated to
protectionism. 238 Rather than trying to protect in-state markets, laws
favoring government entities are presumed to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of the citizenry, and because these laws are not aimed at economic
protectionism, they should not be invalidated by the dormant Commerce
Clause. 239 For convenience of use, this Note will refer to this exception as
'' 240
the "government entity exception.
An ordinance may benefit a public facility as long as it treats all private
entities exactly the same. 24 1 This assertion derives from the tacit
assumption that discrimination requires a comparison between substantially
similar entities. 24 2 "[W]hen the allegedly competing entities provide
different products, . . . there is a threshold question whether the [entities]
are indeed similarly situated for constitutional purposes. ' 24 3 If the entities
are not similarly situated, the entities are serving different markets and the
bedrock purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause-"prohibit[ing] state or
municipal laws whose object is local economic protectionism" 24 4-is not
served. 24 5 Thus, where there is no competition between substantially
similar entities, there is no local economic protectionism to prevent. 246
Public and private facilities do not provide substantially similar products. 247
"Unlike private enterprise, government is vested with the responsibility of
protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. ' 248 Laws favoring
government may be directed toward these cardinal civic responsibilities. 249

236. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S.Ct.
1786, 1795 (2007) (plurality opinion).
237. Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S.Ct. 1801, 1810 (2008) (plurality opinion).
238. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1809 (plurality opinion); United Haulers, 127 S.Ct. at 1795
(plurality opinion).
239. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1809 (plurality opinion); United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1796

(plurality opinion).
240. The Court has drawn a sharp distinction between this exception and the market
participant exception. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1809 (plurality opinion) ("[United Haulers]

was decided independently of the market participation precedents.").
241. United Haulers, 127 S.Ct. at 1795 (plurality opinion).
242. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298 (1997).

243. Id. at 299.
244. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994).
245. Gen. Motors, 519 U.S. at 299.

246. Id. at 300.
247. United Haulers, 127 S.Ct. at 1795 (plurality opinion).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1796.
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The government entity exception is further justified as benefiting
processes that are outside the ambit of the Commerce Clause. 250 The
dormant Commerce Clause is aimed at economic protectionism. 25 1 "[A]
government function is not susceptible to standard dormant Commerce
Clause scrutiny owing to its likely motivation by legitimate objectives
252
distinct from the simple economic protectionism the Clause abhors."
The Court warned against interfering "under the guise of the Commerce
state or municipality is engaging in "traditional
Clause" in cases where the' 253
governmental function[s].
Lastly, the Court identified additional reasons for recognizing a special
exemption for laws that favor government entities. 254 First, "treating public
and private entities the same under the dormant Commerce Clause would
lead to unprecedented and unbounded interference by the courts with state
and local government. '25 5 The Commerce Clause precludes states from
burdening the flow of interstate commerce; it does not give federal courts
256
carte blanche to dictate the practices of state and local government.
Second, in every prior application of the government entity exemption, the
group bearing the greatest burden ratified the ordinance. 257 Standard
violations of the dormant Commerce Clause entail one state shifting its
burdens onto its sister states. 258 "[T]he Court has often recognized that to
the extent that the burden of state regulation falls on interests outside the
state, it is unlikely to be alleviated by the operation of those political
,,259 Where those burdened by a law
restraints normally exerted. ."..
approve its implementation, "[t]here is no reason to step in and hand local
2 60
businesses a victory they could not obtain through the political process."
In United Haulers, the Court found that Oneida County and Herkimer
County did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause when they required
all trash haulers to deliver solid waste to a single, publicly operated waste

250.
251.
252.
253.

Id.
Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1808 (2008) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 1810 (citing UnitedHaulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1796 (plurality opinion)).
Id. (citing United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1796 (plurality opinion)). Thus far, the

Court has only identified trash disposal and taxation of municipal bonds as traditional
government functions. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1811 (plurality opinion); United Haulers, 127
S. Ct. at 1798 (plurality opinion).
254. See Davis, 128 S.Ct. at 1810-11 (plurality opinion); United Haulers, 127 S.Ct. at
1795-97 (plurality opinion).
255. United Haulers, 127 S.Ct. at 1796 (plurality opinion).
256. Id.; Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986).

257. See Davis, 128 S.Ct. at 1815 (plurality opinion) (determining that every state in the
union affirmatively supports the discriminatory tax policy); United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at

1797 (plurality opinion) (determining that most palpable harm falls on the citizens who
voted for the ordinance).
258. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1797 (plurality opinion) ("Our dormant Commerce

Clause cases often find discrimination when a State shifts the costs of regulation to other
States ....).
259. S.Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 767-68 n.2 (1945).
260. United Haulers, 127 S.Ct. at 1797 (plurality opinion).
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processing facility. 26 1 The counties passed the ordinance in response to a
262
solid waste "crisis" threatening the health and safety of their citizens.
Under the ordinance, the Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management
Authority (the Authority), a public benefit corporation, became the only
authorized solid waste processor. 263 Private entities remained free to
collect solid waste, but they were required to dispose of the waste at
facilities owned and operated by the Authority. 2 64 To cover the cost of
recycling and remediation-functions ignored by private waste processing
facilities in the lead-up to the solid waste crisis-these facilities collected
above-market disposal charges. 2 65 Private haulers sued. 266 The private
haulers argued that the flow-control laws violated the dormant Commerce
267
Clause by keeping commerce within the boundaries of the state.
The Court determined that this was not the type of ordinance with which
the Commerce Clause was concerned. 26 8 In doing so, the Court drew an
important distinction between United Haulers and an earlier case with
nearly identical facts, C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown.269 In
Carbone, the Court found that a similar flow-control ordinance violated the
dormant Commerce Clause. 270 The United Haulers Court recognized the
overlap between the cases but identified a key difference: the ordinance in
Carbone supported a private facility; the ordinance in United Haulers
supported a public one. 27 1 Based on the inherent differences between a
public company and a private company, the Court determined that the
United Haulers ordinance was excepted from the standard dormant
272
Commerce Clause analysis.
In Davis, the Court found that Kentucky did not violate the dormant
Commerce Clause when it exempted state income taxes on income earned
273
from in-state municipal bonds while taxing out-of-state municipal bonds.
Kentucky passed this differential tax system to lower interest rates on

261.
262.
263.
264.

Id. at 1798.
Id. at 1790.
Id. at 1791.
Id.

265.
266.
267.
268.

Id.
Id. at 1792.
Id.
Id. at 1797 ("We hold that the Counties' flow control ordinances, which treat in-state

private business interests exactly the same as out-of-state ones, do not discriminate against
interstate commerce for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause." (internal quotation

marks omitted)).
269. Id. at 1793-95; C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 395
(1994).
270. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 395; see also United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1793-95 (plurality
opinion) (comparing the flow-control ordinance in Carbone to the flow-control ordinance in
United Haulers).
271. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1793 (plurality opinion).

272. Id. at 1795-97.
273. Id. at 1819. This is an example of the discriminatory tax system that is ubiquitous in
the United States. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
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Kentucky bonds. 274 Kentucky residents who paid income tax on interest

earned from out-of-state municipal bonds sued. 275 According to these
residents, the selective tax exemption for in-state municipal bonds violated
the dormant Commerce Clause by effectively banning out-of-state
municipal bonds from Kentucky markets. 2 76 The Court ruled in favor of
Kentucky and determined that the selective tax exemption for municipal
bonds-at least, as applied to those municipal bonds that finance public
entities-is not the type of ordinance with which the Commerce Clause was
277
concerned.
4. Discriminatory Taxation
Discriminatory taxation is not subject to a separate analysis under the
dormant Commerce Clause.2 78 Discriminatory tax cases are subject to the
same inquiry as any other discriminatory law.2 79 Some states have
attempted to justify discriminatory taxation under the market participant
exception or as an equivalent measure to providing a subsidy. 2 80 The Court
28 1
has repeatedly found these arguments unavailing.
In New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach,282 the Court found that
Indiana violated the dormant Commerce Clause when it offered tax credits
for motor vehicle fuel sales but limited the tax credit to motor vehicle fuel
produced either in-state or in a state that offered a reciprocal tax benefit. 283
The state created the tax credit to spur the production of ethanol, an
automotive fuel with environmental benefits over carbon-based fuel. 284
Absent government aid, ethanol was too expensive to produce on a
commercial scale. 285 The State also included a reciprocity provision in the
tax credit that limited the credit to ethanol produced in-state and ethanol
produced in a state offering a reciprocal tax credit. 286 According to Indiana,
the reciprocity provision encouraged other states to adopt similar tax
provisions, thereby making ethanol more cost effective. 2 87 Indiana also
advanced the alternative argument that, similar to Maryland's purchase of

274. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1805 (plurality opinion).
275. Id.
276. Brief for Respondents at 1, Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (No. 06-666), 2007 WL 2808463,
at *4.
277. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1817 (plurality opinion).
278. See New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988).
279. See id.
280. See id. at 277-78; Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S.
564, 588-89 (1997).
281. See, e.g., New Energy, 486 U.S. at 277-78; Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at
589-90.
282. 486 U.S. 269 (1988).

283. Id. at 280.
284. Id. at 271.
285. Id.

286. Id. at 272.
287. Id. at 274.
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automobile hulks in Alexandria Scrap,2 88 Indiana was participating in the
market for ethanol and subject to the protection of the market participant
2 90
exception. 2 89 The Court found both of these arguments unconvincing.
According to the Court, discriminatory taxation ordinarily violates the
dormant Commerce Clause. 29 1 Here, the discriminatory taxation violated
the dormant Commerce Clause because it created an economic barrier to
competition. 292 By depriving certain products of a generally available
2 93
beneficial tax treatment, the State created what amounted to a tariff.
Furthermore, the State could not claim the protection of the market
participant exception because taxation is a "primeval governmental
activity" completely separate from market participation. 294 While the tax
credit scheme was economically equivalent to a state subsidy, the economic
equivalence of tax to a subsidy does not make the tax constitutional. 295
Taxation is a regulatory activity. 296 Generally, when a state assesses and
297
computes taxes, it acts as a market regulator, not a market participant.
In Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison,298 the Court
found that Maine violated the dormant Commerce Clause when it offered a
property tax exemption on property owned by charitable institutions, but
limited the exemption to charitable institutes operated for the principal
benefit of Maine residents. 299 A Maine nonprofit summer camp operating
for the benefit of children of the Christian Science faith challenged the
constitutionality of the property tax exemption as applied to charities
operated for the principle benefit of nonresidents. 30 0 While the camp did
not organize for the explicit purpose of serving nonresidents, ninety-five
percent of its campers were residents of other states.301 The State claimed
that the tax was an expenditure of government money to lessen its social
service burden. 30 2 According to this argument, the State used the disparate
real estate tax treatment to subsidize charities furthering the health, safety,
and welfare of Maine citizens. 30 3 In the alternative, Maine argued that,
similar to Maryland's purchase of automobile hulks in Alexandria Scrap,
Maine was a purchaser in the market for charitable services and was

288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976).
New Energy, 486 U.S. at 277.
Id. at 277-78.
Id.
Id. at 275.
Id.
Id. at 277.
Id. at 278 ("Direct subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of

that prohibition; discriminatory taxation of out-of-state manufacturers does.").
296. Id.
297. Id. at 277-78.
298. 520 U.S. 564 (1997).

299. Id. at 595.
300. Id. at 567.
301. Id.

302. Id. at 588.
303. Id. at 588-89.
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151

protected by the market participant exception. 304 First, the Court rejected
the argument that the disparate real estate tax was equivalent to a
subsidy. 30 5 Instead, the Court stated that there is a constitutionally
significant difference between taxes and subsidies. 306 The Court reasoned
that while a subsidy ordinarily imposes no burden on interstate commerce,
discriminatory taxes generally run afoul of the Commerce Clause. 307 Next,
the Court rejected the argument that the disparate real estate tax was
equivalent to market participation. 308 Relying heavily on its decision in
New Energy, the Court determined that "[a] tax exemption is not the sort of
direct state involvement in the market that falls within the market
30 9
participation doctrine."
Part L.A discussed municipal bonds generally. 310 State and local
governments are often authorized to issue municipal bonds provided that
each issue has a public purpose. 3 11 State and local governments have
relatively few substantive limitations on their ability to issue bonds but, as a
practical matter, federal and state tax laws determine the types of bonds that
are issued. 31 2 The current market for municipal bonds is enormous. 313
Part I.B discussed the dormant Commerce Clause. 314 The states are
restrained from regulating interstate commerce. 315 However, states may
participate in interstate commerce so long as their ultimate goal is not local
economic protectionism. 316 The Court has developed an elaborate body of
law to determine the ultimate goal of a given state action. 3 17
The question that emerges is whether states violate the dormant
Commerce Clause when they apply a discriminatory tax system to conduit
bonds. The Court has already determined that states may apply a
discriminatory tax to governmental bonds. 318 Ultimately, the issue is
whether the differences between conduit bonds and governmental bonds
render the reasoning of Davis inapplicable. Advocates have come out on
each side of this issue.
Part II of this Note discusses the alternate appraisals between proponents
and critics of the discriminatory taxation of conduit bonds and how that
appraisal affects the dormant Commerce Clause analysis.

304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

Id. at 589.
Id. at 589-90.
Id.
Id. at 591.
Id. at 593.
Id.

310. See supra Part I.A.
311. See supra Part I.A. 1.

312. See supra Part I.A.2.a-b.
313. See supra Part I.A.2.c.
314. See supra Part I.B.
315. See supra Part I.B.

316. See supra Part I.B.
317. See supra Part I.B.
318. See supra Part I.B.3.
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II. ALTERNATE APPRAISALS: HOW THE QUESTION OF WHETHER CONDUIT
BONDS ADVANCE THE CARDINAL CIVIC RESPONSIBILITIES OF
GOVERNMENT SHAPES THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS

States can apply differential tax treatment to in-state and out-of-state
government bonds without violating the Commerce Clause. 3 19 It is unclear,
however, whether it is constitutional for states to apply the differential tax
treatment to in-state and out-of-state conduit bonds. 320 Amici have come
out on both sides of the issue.
One group of amici has argued that states may tax in-state and out-of32 1
state conduit bonds differently without violating the Commerce Clause.
These amici-herein referred to as "proponents of differential taxation"-maintain that the Davis holding applies equally to every type of municipal
bond.322 According to proponents of differential taxation, the fact that
conduit bonds occasionally finance private activities does not upset the
323
Davis analysis.
A separate group of amici has argued that states cannot apply differential
324
tax treatment to conduit bonds without violating the Commerce Clause.
These amici--"critics of differential taxation"-argue that the private
325
character of conduit bonds renders the logic of Davis inapplicable.
Critics of differential taxation further argue that, in addition to being
distinguishable from Davis,326 the differential taxation of conduit bonds is
327
unconstitutional under the standard dormant Commerce Clause analysis.
319. Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1819 (2008) (plurality opinion).
320. Id. at 1805 n.2. When determining the scope of its ruling, the Court drew a
distinction between municipal bonds and state-issued "private-activity" bonds. Id.; see also
supra note 1 (discussing the difference between "private-activity" bonds and "conduit"
bonds).
321. Brief of the Government Finance Officers Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (No. 06-666), 2007 WL 2115436 [hereinafter GFOA
Brief]; Brief of Multistate Tax Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (No. 06-666), 2007 WL 2115443 [hereinafter Multistate Tax
Comm'n Brief]; Brief of the National Ass'n of State Treasurers as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (No. 06-666), 2007 WL 2088645 [hereinafter
NAST Brief]; Brief Amicus Curiae of Nuveen Investments, Inc. in Support of Petitioners,
Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (No. 06-666), 2007 WL 2088646 [hereinafter Nuveen Brief]; SIFMA
Brief, supra note 112.
322. GFOA Brief, supra note 321, at 16-23 (arguing that states and local governments
have the authority to apply differential taxation to all state and local obligations); Multistate
Tax Comm'n Brief, supra note 321, at 11-13 (same); NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 2, 910 (same); Nuveen Brief, supra note 321, at 7-10 (same).
323. GFOA Brief, supra note 321, at 16-22; Multistate Tax Comm'n Brief, supra note
321, at 11-13; NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 2, 9-10; Nuveen Brief, supra note 321, at 610.
324. Brief of the Tax Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Davis,
128 S. Ct. 1801 (No. 06-666), 2007 WL 2808464 [hereinafter Tax Found. Brief]; Viard
Brief, supra note 120.
325. Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 25.
326. Id. at 8 (distinguishing government bonds from bonds issued for the benefit of
private parties).
327. Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 5-10; Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 9-13.
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At the heart of this conflict is the appraisal of conduit bonds. 328
Proponents of differential taxation have determined that conduit bonds
advance the cardinal civic responsibilities of government. 329 Critics of
differential taxation have determined that conduit bonds do not advance the
cardinal civic responsibilities of government. 330 These determinations
underlie and inform every argument for and against finding the differential
tax treatment of in-state and out-of-state conduit bonds to be
constitutional. 33 1 Understanding the larger conflict between proponents
and critics of differential taxation requires understanding both why amici
disagree about how to appraise conduit bonds 33 2 and how that appraisal
influences each argument. 333
A. The Appraisal of Conduit Bonds
The basis of the argument of proponents of differential taxation is that
334
conduit bonds advance the cardinal civic responsibilities of government.
Municipal bonds cannot be issued for the sole benefit of private industry. 335
Even where private industries are the direct recipients of the tax benefit, as
is the case for conduit bonds, the ultimate beneficiary must be the
citizenry. 336 Were that not the case, the bond issuance would be
unconstitutional regardless of the constitutionality of any subsequent
337
taxation.
Proponents of differential taxation find additional support in the
inefficiency inherent in a contrary result. 338 According to these amici,
328. Compare NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 3 (claiming that debt obligations issued by
public bodies support essential government services, public works programs, and
government operating requirements), with Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 25 (finding that
roughly one-quarter of municipal bonds are issued for the benefit of private firms).
329. NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 3; Nuveen Brief, supra note 321, at 10 ("Municipal
Bonds are used for.., public purposes.").
330. Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 25 ("Private-activity bonds, are issued by state and
local governments acting merely as conduits for non-governmental organizations.").
331. See infra Part II.B.
332. See infra Part II.A.
333. See infra Part II.B.
334. See NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 11 (explaining that conduit bonds advance
public purposes); see also supra Part I.A. 1 (explaining the public purpose doctrine).
335. Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 238 (1920) ("[l~t has come to be settled that the
authority of the States to tax does not include the right to impose taxes for merely private
purposes." (citing Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 155 (1896))).
336. Bolton v. Wharton, 161 S.E. 454, 457 (S.C. 1931).
337. See id.; supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text. The amici do not identify the
public purpose doctrine but they do address the requirement that municipal bonds have a
public purpose. See, e.g., NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 3 (finding municipal bonds
"support essential government services and other government operating requirements,
and.. . fund public works"); Nuveen Brief, supra note 321, at 6-7 (arguing that municipal
bonds benefit the citizenry as opposed to discrete private interests).
338. GFOA Brief, supra note 321, at 24 (arguing that the economic impact of the
selective tax system "is not properly understood as a 'burden [upon] interstate commerce."'
(quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970))); NAST Brief, supra note
321, at 9-10.
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when state and local governments issue conduit bonds they make the
determination that it is more efficient to outsource their cardinal civic
responsibilities than to perform the service themselves. 339 States frequently
make such determinations in other arenas. 340
Since state and local
governments are already allowed to selectively tax in-state and out-of-state
government bonds, to prevent states and local governments from efficiently
outsourcing that responsibility would be at best draconian and at worst
34
perverse. 1
342
Critics of differential taxation challenge this characterization.
According to these amici, the constitutionality of a discriminatory tax
system hinges on the beneficiary of the tax, not the service. 343 Where the
beneficiary of the tax is a government entity, the ordinance is protected
under Davis. 344 Where the ultimate beneficiary is a private entity, the
345
ordinance is stripped of that protection.
Critics of differential taxation find additional support from the history of
conduit bonds, which can be and have been issued to benefit private
industry. 34 6 Congress passed the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of
1968 (the 1968 Act) to deal with the increased volume of municipal bonds
in support of private activity. 347 The 1968 Act revoked the federal tax
exemption for interest earned on bonds that supported industrial
development. 348 According to Congress, "since the primary obligor was
not a State or political subdivision" such bonds "were not obligations of a
State... or any political subdivision within the meaning of [the federal tax
exemption statute]. ' 349 Congress passed the Mortgage Subsidy Act of 1980
to address the dramatic increase in a subspecies of conduit bonds:
mortgage subsidy bonds. 350 These bonds, which were issued to finance
mortgage loans for single-family homes, were not subject to the strictures
of the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968.351 Congress, still
339. See Nuveen Brief, supra note 321, at 10-11; see also NAST Brief, supra note 321,
at 11; STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND, supra note 1, at 17-19.
340. Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Privatizationof GovernmentalServices by State or
Local Governmental Agency, 65 A.L.R. 5th 1, 1 (1999) ("Governmental privatization, under
which private firms are engaged to provide services that civil servants might have provided,
is a burgeoning phenomenon."); see, e.g., Burum v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 184 P.2d 505
(Cal. 1947) (discussing privatization of legal services); Robinson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs,
504 P.2d 263 (Kan. 1972) (discussing privatization of ambulance services).
341. See GFOA Brief, supra note 321, at 8-12; Nuveen Brief, supra note 321, at 10-11.
342. See Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 21-23.

343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.

See id.
See Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S.Ct. 1801 (2008) (plurality opinion).
See id. at 1819.
See Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 25.
Pub. L. No. 90-364, 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. (82 Stat.) 251.
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND, supra note 1, at 12-13.
H.R. REP. No. 90-1533, at 32 (1968) (Conf. Rep.).
Pub. L. No. 96-499, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. (94 Stat.) 2599. By 1980, the volume of

mortgage subsidy bonds had grown to $10.5 billion. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
BACKGROUND, supra note 1, at 13.
351. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND, supra note 1, at 13. The

Mortgage Subsidy Act of 1980 did not ban mortgage subsidy bonds, but it did limit the types
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facing the expansion of the private-activity bond market, passed the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), 352 which further
3 53
restricted the availability of the federal tax exemption for conduit bonds.
A mere two years later, Congress was "extremely concerned with the
volume of tax-exempt bonds used to finance private activities" 354 and
responded with the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, which imposed volume
limitations on the aggregate amount of such bonds. 355 Two years after that,
Congress passed the Tax Reform Act of 1986,356 legislation meant to quell
the rising tide of tax-exempt conduit bonds. 357 While these acts concern
the federal tax exemption rather than the state tax exemption, they illustrate
the tendency of state and local governments to issue municipal bonds for
the benefit of private industry. 3 58 Thus, despite the claims of the
proponents of differential taxation, critics of differential 359taxation argue
there is a legitimate likelihood of unnecessary privatization.
360
Proponents of differential taxation challenge this characterization.
Proponents assert the history of the federal tax exemption for conduit bonds
only illustrates momentary federal budgetary concerns, not the
constitutionality of the state and local government differential tax
system.361 They argue that one of the measures outlined above challenged
the legality of the differential tax system. 362 This position is buttressed by
subsequent congressional measures to increase the ambit of the federal tax
exemption for conduit bonds and lessen the volume limitations on the
363
aggregate amount of such bonds.
This disagreement is the fundamental conflict between proponents and
critics of differential taxation. 364
Every other argument about the

of mortgage subsidy bonds that are entitled to the federal subsidy. Id. Today, two types of
mortgage subsidy bonds are entitled to the federal subsidy: qualified mortgage bonds and
qualified veterans' mortgage bonds. I.R.C. § 146(e)(1)(A), (C) (2006).
352. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. (96 Stat.) 324.
353. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND, supra note 1,at 13-14.
354. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ACT OF 1986, supra note 67, at 4.

355. Pub. L. No. 98-369, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 494.
356. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) 2085.
357. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND, supra note 1, at 14-16.
358. See Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 25.
359. See id.
360. GFOA Brief, supra note 321, at 4-8 (claiming that Congress has let the matter of
municipal bond tax exemption rest); NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 11-14 (focusing the
historical inquiry on the Court's noninterference with the differential tax system).
361. See GFOA Brief, supra note 321, at 4-8; NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 11-16.
362. See GFOA Brief, supra note 321, at 4-8; NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 11-16.
363. See, e.g., Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. (119
Stat.) 594 (authorizing a second type of tax-credit bond for clean renewable energy facilities
eligible for federal tax exemption); Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-647, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 3342 (adding high-speed intercity rail
facility to the list of facilities available for federal tax-exempt financing).
364. This argument has only become sharply focused on the character of conduit bonds in
the wake of Davis. See Leading Cases, Dormant Commerce Clause-State Taxation of
Municipal Bonds, 122 HARV. L. REv. 276, 277 (2008).
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constitutionality of the differential taxation of conduit bonds stems from
this central disagreement. 365
B. How the Appraisalof Conduit Bonds Affects the Dormant Commerce
Clause Analysis
In Davis, the Court identified four key considerations for evaluating
whether the differential tax treatment of in-state and out-of-state
government bonds is constitutional. 366 These considerations include the
dormant Commerce Clause analysis, 367 the market participant exception to
the dormant Commerce Clause analysis, 3 68 the government entity exception
370
to the standard dormant Commerce Clause analysis, 369 and the Pike test.
Both proponents and critics of differential taxation generally agree that
these are the key considerations for evaluating the constitutionality of the
37 1
differential tax treatment of in-state and out-of-state conduit bonds.
Their conclusions, however, differ widely. 372
1. Standard Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis
Proponents of differential taxation have not argued that the differential
taxation of conduit bonds will survive the standard dormant Commerce
Clause analysis. 373 While not quite conceding that the differential taxation
365. See infra Part.II.B.
366. Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1808-19 (2008) (plurality opinion).
367. Id. at 1808-10.
368. Id. at 1811-14.
369. Id. at 1810-11.
370. Id. at 1817-19.
371. For examples of proponents of differential taxation identifying these considerations
when evaluating the constitutionality of the differential tax treatment of conduit bonds, see
GFOA Brief, supra note 321, at 1-3; Multistate Tax Comm'n Brief, supra note 321, at 3-4;
NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 9-10; Nuveen Brief, supra note 321, at 2-5; and SIFMA
Brief, supra note 112, at 3-5. For examples of critics of differential taxation identifying
these considerations as key for evaluating the constitutionality of the differential tax
treatment of conduit bonds, see Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 5-8. Additionally, there is no
agreement that these are the only considerations for evaluating the constitutionality of the
differential tax treatment of conduit bonds. See, e.g., Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at
15-21 (arguing that the conflict can be resolved by reference to the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Nuveen Brief, supra note 321, at 10-20
(arguing for a sui generis exception for the differential taxation of municipal bonds based on
the system's prevalence and importance); SIFMA Brief, supra note 112, at 11-17 (arguing
for a sui generis exception for the differential taxation of municipal bonds based on the
instability and price uncertainty that would result if the system were revoked). However, the
dormant Commerce Clause, government entity exception, market participant exception, and
Pike test are generally held up as the principal considerations. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 180819 (plurality opinion).
372. Compare SIFMA Brief, supra note 112, at 18 (determining that the differential
taxation of municipal bonds is constitutional), with Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 29
("[The] Court should hold the [state] exclusion unconstitutional.").
373. See, e.g., GFOA Brief, supra note 321 (eschewing standard dormant Commerce
Clause analysis and focusing on the exceptions); NAST Brief, supra note 321 (same);
Nuveen Brief, supra note 321 (same).
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of conduit bonds is unconstitutional under the standard dormant Commerce
Clause analysis, most proponents of differential taxation have argued that
the differential taxation of all municipal bonds-not just conduit bondsshould be subject to an exception. 374 Most of the key exceptions proposed
by these amici were discussed explicitly by the Davis plurality 37 5 and are
addressed elsewhere in this Note. 376 A separate key exception, a sui
generis exemption for all municipal bonds, is best discussed here.
The argument for a sui generis exception for all municipal bonds is
founded in equity and the state's authority as sovereign. 377 Proponents of
differential taxation reason that it would be inequitable to invalidate the
differential taxation of municipal bonds given the long history of allowing
such taxation. 378 Since the founding of this nation, state and local
governments have issued debt obligations to raise capital in order to
promote the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens. 379 For almost a
century-since the earliest days of income taxes 38 0-states have likewise
been empowered to exempt their debt obligations from taxation. 381 Today,

374. GFOA Brief, supra note 321 (arguing for a sui generis exception and the
government entity exception); Multistate Tax Comm'n Brief, supra note 321 (arguing for the
government entity exception); NAST Brief, supra note 321 (arguing for a sui generis
exception, the market participation exception, and the government entity exception); Nuveen
Brief, supra note 321 (arguing for a sui generis exception and the government entity
exception); SIFMA Brief, supra note 112 (arguing for government entity exception). The
approach followed by these amici is similar to the Davis Court's analysis. See Davis, 128 S.
Ct. at 1808-19 (plurality opinion). In Davis, the Court invoked the standard dormant
Commerce Clause analysis, id. at 1808-10, but clearly applied the dormant Commerce
Clause exceptions to the facts of the case, id. at 1810-19.
375. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1810-19 (plurality opinion).
376. See infra Part II.B.2-4.
377. GFOA Brief, supra note 321, at 3 (arguing that the differential tax system is a
"natural and salutary consequence of the distinctive relationship between a sovereign and its
citizens"); Multistate Tax Comm'n Brief, supra note 32 1, at 11 ("State governments are
sovereigns, for which the whole notion of competition, and the very concerns of the
Commerce Clause, do not apply."); NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 11-18 (arguing that state
authority to exempt in-state municipal bonds from state taxation is an aspect of state
sovereignty); Nuveen Brief, supra note 321, at 9 (determining that states have the inherent
power to raise funds through debt issuances and provide favorable tax treatment of those
debt issuances).
378. GFOA Brief, supra note 321, at 3 ("Since the inception of modem state income
taxes during the Progressive Era, state governments have granted preferential tax exemptions
for the interest earned on in-state municipal bonds and have had no reason to question their
validity."); NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 11-12 (tracing the history of both municipal
bonds and the differential taxation of municipal bonds); SIFMA Brief, supra note 112, at 8
(stating that a contrary decision would overturn "a widespread network of statutes and
governmental programs that have developed based on settled law since 1881").
379. NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 11 ("Alexander Hamilton, perhaps the foremost
authority on American public finance, observed that credit 'is of the greatest consequence to
every country."' (quoting ALEXANDER HAMILTON, PUBLIC CREDIT No. 2, in 1 REPORTS OF
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY OF THE UNITED STATES (Duff Green 1828))).
380. NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 12; see, e.g., 1918 Mass. Acts page no. 7; 1919 N.Y.
Laws page no. 1641-42.
381. See GFOA Brief, supra note 321, at 3; NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 11-12;
SIFMA Brief, supra note 112, at 7-8.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

use of the discriminatory tax system is widespread. 382 Thirty-seven states
employ this system or something substantially similar; 383 four states
employ a comparable tax system; 384 and two states offer reciprocal tax
treatment for municipal bonds. 385 Outstanding state and local government
debts subject to this tax treatment total at least $2.2 trillion. 3 86 Such a long387
standing and widely accepted practice is not lightly revoked.
For the whole time that this practice became widespread, Congress knew
of the practice 388 and actively supported it. 3 89 For the past ninety years,
Congress exempted all municipal bonds issued by states and municipalities
from federal taxation. 390 Over the past eighty-seven years, Congress
authorized numerous interstate compacts, several of which formed public
authorities empowered to issue municipal bonds that are subject to the
discriminatory tax system. 39 1 Congress explicitly addressed the selective
tax system in 1976, when it expanded the federal tax exemption on
municipal bonds to allow mutual funds to pass the tax savings on to their
shareholders. 392 Furthermore, within the past decade Congress twice
382. GFOA Brief, supra note 321, at 7-8 (determining that the differential taxation of
municipal bonds is "a widespread, longstanding, and uninterrupted practice by the States
that, until very recently, has gone unchallenged"); NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 12
("Today, 42 States provide preferential tax treatment for individual or corporate income
earned on all or some in-State municipal bonds."); Nuveen Brief, supra note 321, at 4-5
("The importance and popularity of such single-state [municipal bond] funds are welldemonstrated by the fact that there are 481 of them currently available in the market .... "
(citing INV. CO. INST., 2007 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 96, 98 (47th ed. 2007),

available at http://www.icifactbook.org)).
383. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
384. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
385. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
386. U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/govs/estimate/0600ussl1.html (last
visited Sept. 19, 2009).
387. NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 14; see, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397
U.S. 664, 678 (1970) ("[While] no one acquires a vested or protected right in violation of the
Constitution by long use,..., an unbroken practice.., is not something to be lightly cast
aside."); see also GFOA Brief, supra note 321, at 9 ("To force the States to shoulder these
breathtaking . . . costs, despite their reasonable and substantial reliance on extant
understandings of the dormant Commerce Clause, is wholly inequitable.").
388. H.R. REP. No. 88-1480, pt. 2, at 258-59 (1964) (listing states that exempt their own
bonds from taxation, while taxing bonds of other States); see also H.R. REP. No. 90-413, at
172 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2252 ("State and local governments
generally do not directly tax interest on Federal bonds, but they tax the interest income on
bonds issued by other States.").
389. GFOA Brief, supra note 321, at 7-8 (determining that Congress has expressed
support for state tax exemptions for in-state municipal bonds); NAST Brief, supra note 321,
at 14-16 (same).
390. I.R.C. §§ 103, 141-50 (2006); NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 16.
391. NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 16. Congress signed the first such compact in 1921.
See Port of New York Authority Compact, ch. 77, 42 Stat. 174, 176-78 (1921). Since then,
Congress has authorized a number of similar compacts. See, e.g., New Hampshire-Maine
Interstate School Compact, Pub. L. No. 102-494, 106 Stat. 3153 (1992); Delaware River
Joint Commission Compact, ch. 258, 47 Stat. 308 (1932).
392. See NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 15; Scott K. Attaway, Note, The Case for
ConstitutionalDiscriminationin Taxation of Out-of-State Municipal Bonds, 76 B.U. L. REv.
737, 742 (1996); see also Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.

CONDUIT BONDS

2009]

enacted legislation empowering states to issue additional tax-exempt
bonds. 393 The pervasiveness of these practices "indicates that Congress
views [the selective tax system] as consistent with constitutional
requirements."

394

According to the proponents of discriminatory taxation, to revoke the
power to exempt in-state municipal bonds from state taxation at this late
date would upset the reasonable expectations of bond issuers and
purchasers. 39 5 After decades of Congressional acquiescence to the
municipal bond exemption and reasonable reliance on that acquiescence,
the expectations of the market have been settled. 396 Invalidating the
exemption now would vastly disrupt both the operation of state and local
State and local
governments and the municipal bond market.397
based on the
obligations
financial
massive
incurred
governments have
398
understanding that these exemptions are constitutional.
Furthermore, if the judiciary rescinds the exemption, the rescission may
apply retroactively, jeopardizing state and local budgets. 399 "States could
be forced to refund all recently paid taxes on out-of-state municipal bond
interest, and most would effectively be required to forego taxing the interest
on all outstanding out-of-state municipal bonds." 400 Without the taxes
earned on these bonds, governments would either have to cut back services
or issue additional debt to account for the shortfall. 40 1 These consequences
(90 Stat.) 1930 (amending the Internal Revenue Code to allow mutual funds to pass the tax
savings on municipal bonds to their shareholders).
393. NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 15; see also Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-135, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. (199 Stat.) 2577 (authorizing a new type of
qualified private-activity bond); Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-147, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 21 (authorizing $8 billion in exempt-facility
bonds to finance the reconstruction of southern Manhattan in the aftermath of 9/11).
394. NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 15; see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S.
278, 304-05 (1997) (finding that Congressional inaction is a "clear implication" that states
were within their power to act); GFOA Brief, supra note 321, at 7-8 (determining that
Congress tacitly expressed support for state-tax exemptions for in-state municipal bonds).
395. GFOA Brief, supra note 321, at 8-12; NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 17-18;
Nuveen Brief, supra note 321, at 15-20; SIFMA Brief, supra note 112, at 11-17.
396. See, e.g., NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 17 ("State and local governments have
issued municipal bonds in reliance upon the availability of State [and local] tax exemptions.
In addition, States have assessed taxes and adopted budgets based on the expectation.., that
out-of-state bonds need not be granted the same exemption.").
397. Id. at 17-18.
398. GFOA Brief, supra note 321, at 12 ("Given that many outstanding bonds will not
mature for another thirty years, [invaliding the differential tax system] would cost state
governments billions of dollars in foregone tax revenue."); NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 3
("More than $350 billion of long-term municipal bonds were issued by States in each year
from 2002 through 2006." (citing BOND BUYER, THE BOND BUYERITHOMPSON FINANCIAL

YEARBOOK 14-15 (2006))); Nuveen Brief, supra note 321, at 11 ("[T]here was more than $2
trillion in state and local bonds outstanding as of March 2007."); SIFMA Brief, supra note
112, at 11 ("The municipal bond market is enormous .. "); Hanson, supra note 125.
399. NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 17-18.
400. GFOA Brief, supra note 321, at 2.
401. Nuveen Brief, supra note 321, at 16-17 ("The state would then have to choose
whether, in light of the new economic situation, it would (1) pay a higher rate of interest to
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would, of course, be matched by a windfall for in-state purchasers of out-ofstate municipal bonds-a result that is manifestly unfair. 402 Alternatively,
if states and municipalities are both willing and able to revoke the tax
exemption for in-state municipal bonds, 40 3 the value of municipal bonds
already held by in-state investors could drop substantially. 4 04 In-state
municipal bondholders purchased bonds at a lower interest rate in reliance
on the application of the tax exemption. 40 5 Without the tax exemption, the
value of these investments would plummet
and the reasonable expectations
40 6
of the investors would be defeated.
The argument that equity requires a sui generis exception for the
differential taxation of municipal bonds from the standard dormant
Commerce Clause analysis is buttressed by the argument that the state has
authority to do so as sovereign. 40 7 Like the equity argument, the state
sovereignty argument derives much of its force from the long history of
municipal bonds. 40 8 According to some proponents of differential taxation,
because states and municipalities have taxed municipal bonds since the
advent of the income tax, states and municipalities have acquired the power
to do so. 409 Given the longstanding acquiescence to the usurpation of this
power, if the power to tax municipal bonds must be abridged it should be
state residents to offset the taxes, (2) require state residents to pay the taxes, or (3) forego
collecting taxes on all municipal bonds, regardless of the state of origin."); see also NAST
Brief, supra note 321, at 9 ("State and local governments might be required to cut services,
cancel projects, or raise taxes.").
402. NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 18.
403. States and municipalities may not be constitutionally able to revoke this tax
exemption. See GFOA Brief, supra note 321, at 11 ("For most States, the option of taxing
the interest earned on in-state municipal bonds that investors have already purchased would
be impracticable, if not legally foreclosed."); NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 17 (positing
that states that made a contractual commitment that interest on in-state bonds will be exempt
from state taxation may not break that commitment).
404. NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 17 ("[I]f the State tax exemption is eliminated for
future years, the value of municipal bonds held by individual investors may fall
significantly."); Nuveen Brief, supra note 321, at 16 ("Any conceivable alteration of the
state income tax exemption.., would alter the economics of bond fund investments, with
the potential to shift billions of dollars in value."); see also SIFMA Brief, supra note 112, at
14-15 ("Investors who continue to trade in the municipal bond market would face the
consequences of the uncertainty caused by disruption of the status quo."). But cf Tax Found.
Brief, supra note 324, at 23-25 (arguing that a repeal of the tax provision would not unduly
impact municipal bond markets).
405. GFOA Brief, supra note 321, at 17 ("Because of the tax exemption,.., taxpayers
are willing to accept a lower pre-tax rate of return on in-state municipal bonds."); NAST
Brief, supra note 321, at 17 ("Many investors have purchased in-State municipal bonds in
reliance on the availability of a State tax exemption."); see also Nuveen Brief, supra note
321, at 12-15 (linking the rise in single-state municipal bond funds with the tax benefits for
municipal bonds); SIFMA Brief, supra note 112, at 17 ("The valuation process of municipal
bonds is ...a complicated one, taking into consideration things like their typically low
default rate, taxable rate (if any), and other factors specific to the issuing municipality.").
406. NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 17; Nuveen Brief, supra note 321, at 16; SIFMA
Brief, supra note 112, at 14-15.
407. GFOA Brief, supra note 321, at 3-8; NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 11-18.
408. GFOA Brief, supra note 321, at 3-8; NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 11-16.
409. GFOA Brief, supra note 321, at 3-8; NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 11-16.
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abridged by Congress-not the courts. 4 10 Essentially, these amici argue
that the Supreme Court should yield and let Congress devise a rule. 4 11 In
support of this position, proponents of differential taxation note that "[t]here
is a strong tradition of... deferring to Congress's superintendence of
interstate commerce" in matters of state taxation. 4 12 More importantly,
only Congress is capable of drafting a purely prospective remedy. 4 13 While
a prospective remedy would not avert every evil, it would avert the most
4 14
egregious ones.
This argument finds support in the Davis decision. 4 15 In Davis, the
Court determined that that "government function[s] [are] not susceptible to
standard dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny." 4 16 Such functions evade the
standard dormant Commerce Clause analysis because their motivations are
presumed to be legitimate. 4 17 Legitimate motivations, distinct from
"simple economic protectionism," are not the target of the Commerce
Clause and should not be subject to it. 4 18 In Davis, the Court applied this
4 19
reasoning to the discriminatory tax system for general municipal bonds.
In doing so, it determined that "the issuance of debt securities to pay for
public projects is a quintessentially public function." 420 This determination
42 1
was primarily founded upon the venerable history of municipal bonds
and the core purpose of such bonds-to shoulder the cardinal civic
4 22
responsibilities of government.
Critics of differential taxation argue that the differential taxation of
conduit bonds are not subject to any exception from the Commerce
Clause 423 and should be found unconstitutional under the standard dormant
4 24
Commerce Clause analysis.

410. GFOA Brief, supra note 321, at 8 (finding that Congress is expressly charged with
the duty to superintend the Commerce Clause and that the courts should not interfere in the
face of tacit Congressional approval of the practice); NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 14-16
(tracing the history of congressional approval of the differential taxation of municipal
bonds); see also Multistate Tax Comm'n Brief, supra note 321, at 4-5 (finding a similar
result based on an argument other than state sovereignty); Nuveen Brief, supra note 321, at 5
(same).
411. See, e.g., GFOA Brief, supra note 321, at 8.
412. GFOA Brief, supra note 321, at 12.
413. Id. at 2 ("Only Congress could craft a purely prospective remedy that applied solely
to municipal bonds that have not yet been issued.").
414. See id.
415. Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1808-11 (2008) (plurality opinion).
416. Id. at 1810 (citing United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt.
Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1796 (2007) (plurality opinion)).
417. Id. at 1809-10.
418. Id. at 1810.
419. Id. at 1810-11.
420. Id. at 1810.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 1810-11. These cardinal civic responsibilities are protecting the health, safety,
and welfare of citizens. Id. at 1811.
423. Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 13-14; Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 21-26.
424. Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 5-10; Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 9-13.
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The basic contention of critics of differential taxation is that differential
taxation of conduit bonds violates the dormant Commerce Clause. 425 The
critics contend that differential taxation of conduit bonds violates the
dormant Commerce Clause because it promotes in-state businesses at the
expense of out-of-state businesses. 42 6 Under the selective tax exemption, a
state does not tax residents on interest income from in-state municipal
bonds. 42 7 At the same time, the state taxes residents for interest income
earned on out-of-state municipal bonds. 4 28 These provisions work together
429
to benefit in-state interests and burden out-of-state economic interests.
In-state economic interests benefit because local industries financed with
such bonds are able to borrow at a lower cost. 430 Simultaneously, since
municipal bonds do not offer competitive rates of return absent offsetting
tax breaks, out-of-state borrowers are effectively barred from the in-state
market. 43 ' With extraterritorial bonds effectively barred from the market,
in-state bonds have substantially less competition. 432 At the same time,
receive lower returns than in-state purchasers on the
out-of-state purchasers
4 33
same securities.
According to these critics, the differential taxation of conduit bonds is
exactly the kind of activity the dormant Commerce Clause is designed to
prevent. 4 34 Under the first line of dormant Commerce Clause analysis, a
statute that discriminates against interstate commerce is virtually per se
invalid. 43 5 A statute discriminates against commerce when it treats in-state
and out-of-state economic interests differently to the benefit of the former
and the burden of the latter. 436 Here, the state taxes all out-of-state
425. Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 5-10; Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 9-13.
426. Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 11 (finding the tax system upsets the principle
of competitive neutrality by taxing out-of-state activity for the benefit of in-state activity);
Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 9 (finding the tax break creates an unconstitutional in-state
subsidy).
427. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
428. Id.
429. Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 5-10; Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 9-13.
430. Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 10 ("The state tax code is designed to make
investing in [in-state] bonds the only way such individuals can lower their effective tax rate
on municipal bond income."); Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 9 ("[The] exemption grants a
tax reduction to [in-state] residents who purchase [in-state] municipal bonds.").
431. Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 3-4 (arguing that the tax break seeks "to protect
a state's existing industry from interstate competition"); Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 1011 (arguing that the tax break discourages in-state purchasers from transacting with out-ofstate sellers).
432. Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 3-4 (finding that the selective municipal-bond
tax exemption inhibits competition and discriminates against interstate commerce); Viard
Brief, supra note 120, at 16 (same).
433. Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 14 (determining the selective municipal bond
tax exemption "penalizes only . . . those who invest in bonds out-of-state"); Viard Brief,
supra note 120, at 16 ("By inhibiting such competition and discriminating against interstate
commerce, the selective municipal bond tax exemption has greatly reduced investor wellbeing.").
434. Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 4; Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 10.
435. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994).
436. Id.
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437
municipal bonds and exempts conduit bonds that finance local industry.
This reduces the supply of bonds in the in-state market providing
competitive returns. 438 With the supply reduced, the market for in-state
conduit bonds increases. 4 39 The cost of this benefit is borne by out-of-state
municipal bonds that are effectively barred from the in-state market. 440 In
fact, the fundamental purpose of this system is just that: to protect in-state
securities from, and at the expense of, extraterritorial securities. 4 41 These
are not incidental effects on the free flow of commerce; this is a cordoning
442 affecting roughly one-fourth of a $2.2 billion
off of commerce,
44 3
industry.
While discriminatory statutes are virtually per se invalid, they are not
automatically invalid. 444 A facially discriminatory statute can survive the
strong presumption of invalidity if it "advances a legitimate local purpose
that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory
4 45
altematives."
Critics of differential taxation argue that the selective tax treatment of
conduit bonds does not meet this standard. 44 6 According to these critics,
states could employ nondiscriminatory practices to achieve the same
purposes as conduit bonds by issuing government bonds instead of conduit
bonds. 447 These bonds would be used to fund facilities and services
comparable to those operated by private entities. 448 The principle
difference, however, is that these facilities and services are run by
governmental agencies. 44 9 The United Haulers Court directly addressed
this issue. 4 50 In United Haulers, the Court ruled on a flow-control
ordinance requiring trash haulers to deliver solid waste to a single waste
processing facility. 45 1 Trash haulers challenged the ordinance because the
single waste processing facility charged higher fees. 452 The case for these

437. Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 10; Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 5.
438. See Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 10-11.
439. See Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 3-4; Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 10-11.
440. See Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 10-11.
441. See Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 3-4; Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 10-11.
442. See Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 3-4; Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 16.
443. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 128, intro.
444. New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988).
445. Id.
446. See Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 26-29; Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 12.
447. Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 15 ("The Commerce Clause . .. does not
prohibit states from bestowing benefits on a favored activity while leaving all other actors as
they were."); see also Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 12 (offering an alternative solution:
"A direct subsidy to municipalities, quite simply, would not discriminate against interstate
commerce.").
448. See, e.g., Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S.Ct. 1801, 1805 n.2 (2008) (plurality
opinion); Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 25.
449. See Davis, 128 S.Ct. at 1805 n.2 (plurality opinion); Viard Brief, supra note 120, at
25.
450. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S.Ct.
1786, 1792-97 (2007) (plurality opinion).

451. Id. at 1786-98.
452. Id. at 1792.

FORDHAMLA WREVIEW

[Vol. 78

haulers was compelling; the Court had already determined that a nearly
identical flow-control ordinance was unconstitutional. 453 Ultimately, the
United Haulers Court distinguished this earlier precedent 454 and
determined the later flow-control ordinance was constitutional. 4 55 The
earlier flow-control ordinance required trash haulers to deliver solid waste
to a private waste processing facility. 4 56 The later flow-control ordinance
required haulers to deliver solid waste to a government facility. 4 57 The
United Haulers Court noted that, had the earlier facility been public, the
ordinance would have been constitutional. 458 Nothing in the Constitution
prevents a state from owning the types of facilities that are sponsored by
conduit bonds. 4 59 At least one critic has argued that, since states can
employ the nondiscriminatory practice of financing state-created benefit
4 60 such
corporations to achieve the same purpose as issuing conduit 46bonds,
1
invalidity.
of
presumption
bonds do not overcome the strong
If an ordinance fails the first prong of the dormant Commerce Clause
analysis, the ordinance is invalid. 462 The second prong, the so-called Pike
analysis, 4 63 is a backstop. 464 It provides an additional layer of review to
ensure that statutes do not evade the letter of the law while flouting its
purpose. 4 65 Under the argument advanced by critics of differential
taxation, since the selective tax system as applied to conduit bonds fails the
first prong of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis, 466 there is no need to
analyze the system under the less restrictive second prong. 467 Assuming,
arguendo, that the second prong did apply to the selective tax system as
468
applied to conduit bonds, the system would still be unconstitutional.
Under the second prong, a statute "will be upheld unless the burden
imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits. ''4 69 This test is a cost-benefit analysis. 470

453. Id.; C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 394-95 (1994).
454. United Haulers, 127 S.Ct. at 1795 (plurality opinion).
455. Id. at 1798.
456. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 387.
457. United Haulers, 127 S.Ct. at 1791 (plurality opinion). Specifically, the facility was
a state-created public benefit corporation. Id.
458. Id. at 1793-95.
459. See Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S.Ct. 1801, 1819 (2008) (plurality opinion).
460. Id.
461. See New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988); Viard Brief,
supra note 120, at 25-26.
462. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994).
463. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (establishing the test); Fox, supra
note 188, at 176 (referring to the inquiry as the "Pike rule").
464. See supra notes 188-99 and accompanying text.
465. See supra notes 188-99 and accompanying text.
466. Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 26-29; Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 12.
467. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994).
468. Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 8 ("[T]he selective municipal bond tax exemption
fails that balancing test.").
469. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citing Huron Cement Co. v.
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)).
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At least one group of critics of differential taxation claims that the
selective tax system as applied to conduit bonds fails this test. 471 These
amici concede that the selective tax system has a legitimate purpose: to
fund the work of government. 472 The selective tax system induces citizens
to lend money to state and local governments at favorable rates of interest
and lowers the cost of financing
public works. 473 This purpose applies
474
bonds.
conduit
equally to
Critics of differential taxation contend, however, that the selective
47 5
taxation of conduit bonds does not advance its purported purpose.
Although it is generally accepted that the selective tax exemption allows
municipalities to lower their financing costs, 476 these critics have argued
that a simple economic evaluation proves this is not the case. 477 According
to these amici, when state and local governments exempt income earned on
in-state bonds, they lose revenue. 4 78 At best, this system is "a wash
480
economically." 479 At worst, this system fails to recoup its tax losses. 48 1
Simultaneously, the burdens of the selective tax system are immense.
The selective tax system for municipal bonds has segmented the national
market for municipal bonds. 482 "When every state attempts to obtain the
bulk of its municipal financing from its own residents and to discourage
them from purchasing municipal bonds issued by other states,... [t]he
diversification, liquidity and cost savings offered by an unimpeded national
municipal bond market are lost."'4 83 This is exactly the kind of "economic

484
Balkanization" the dormant Commerce Clause was created to prevent.

470. Id.; see also Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1817 (2008) (plurality
opinion); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
471. See, e.g., Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 8 ("The harms caused by the selective
exemption far outweigh the doubtful benefits.").
472. Id. at 18 (recognizing that the market Balkanization caused by the selective
exemption attempts to provide an offsetting benefit by lowering a state's financing costs).
473. See NFMA Brief, supra note 17, at 8-10.
474. See id. at 6-7.
475. See, e.g., Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 18-19.
476. See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND, supra note 1, at 4-5;
GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 58, at 215.

477. See, e.g., Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 18-19.
478. Id. at 18 ("The state effectively takes money out of one pocket and places it in
another."). Other groups have reached a similar conclusion. See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM.
ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND, supra note 1, at 4-5.

479. Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 18.
480. Id. at 18-19 ("[A] state government may actually be worse off financially for
choosing this route to reduce its financing costs.").
481. See Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 17-18.
482. Id. at 18.
483. Id. at 15.
484. Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1808 (2008) (plurality opinion) (citing
"economic protectionism" as the primary concern of the dormant Commerce Clause).
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Even though most laws survive the Pike analysis, 4 85 critics of differential
4 86
taxation reason that the differential taxation of conduit bonds does not.
Separate from the dormant Commerce Clause analysis, critics of
differential taxation refute the claim that the differential taxation of
municipal bonds is privy to a sui generis exception. 487 Thus, according to
critics of differential taxation, the proponents' main argument for
differential taxation of municipal bonds is unfounded.488
2. Market Participant Exception
Under the market participant doctrine, states and municipalities may
discriminate in favor of their own citizens when they act as market
participants. 489 States and municipalities act as market participants when
they buy or sell goods or services. 490 According to proponents of
differential taxation, when states and municipalities sell municipal bonds,
they are acting as market participants. 49 1 Thus, when states and
municipalities exempt municipal bonds from in-state taxation, they are
permissibly favoring their
own citizens in accordance with the market
49 2
participant exception.
Proponents of differential taxation find additional support for this
argument from the fact that the programs funded by municipal bonds would
not exist in the absence of government action. 493 "When the state is
creating commerce that would not otherwise exist, it has greater freedom to
shape that commerce than when it is intruding into a previously existing
private market. ' '494 According to these proponents, this creation of
commerce underlies the market-participant rule. 49 5 Under this argument,
by sponsoring public works that the market does not naturally produce, the

485. See, e.g., Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kan., 489 U.S. 493,
525-26 (1989); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 472 (1981).
486. See, e.g., Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 8.
487. See, e.g., id,at 16 (determining that the states' role as sovereign is both "obviously
true" and "irrelevant to this case"); see also Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 22-26
(arguing that overturning the differential tax system would not infringe state sovereignty).
488. See Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 9. The second contention of proponents of
differential taxation-that differential taxation of conduit bonds is protected by state
sovereignty-has not been explicitly addressed by critics of differential taxation.
489. See White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 208 (1983)
(citing Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 n.7 (1980)); see also Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976).
490. See Hughes, 426 U.S. at 810; Bogen, supra note 207, at 543.
491. See, e.g., NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 18-24; Nuveen Brief, supra note 321, at
6-10.
492. See, e.g., NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 24; Nuveen Brief, supra note 321, at 10.
493. NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 4; Nuveen Brief, supra note 321, at 10-15; see also
Attaway, supra note 392, at 757 n. 138.
494. Attaway, supra note 392, at 754 (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL
CHOICES 146 (1985)).
495. See Nuveen Brief, supra note 321, at 10-15; Attaway, supra note 392, at 755.
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government is acting 496
as a market participant and is subject to the market
participant exception.
Critics of differential taxation characterize the discriminatory taxation of
municipal bonds very differently. 49 7 According to these critics, there is a
498
sharp distinction between market participation and market regulation.
499
Taxation, they argue, is market regulation.
Under the selective
municipal bond tax exemption, the state imposes a benefit through the
income tax system. 500
This benefit derives after the transaction is
completed. 501
Thus, the transaction and the taxation are separate
actions. 50 2 When a state provides a tax exemption on the proceeds of
conduit bonds after the transaction is completed, the state is acting as a
market regulator. 50 3 Under this argument, market regulation and market
participation are fundamentally separate acts.5 04 This point undercuts the
core justification for the market-participant exception: to allow states to act
as traditional market participants. 505
To a certain degree, Davis already resolved the market participation
argument.506 In Davis, a plurality determined that the market participant
exemption applies to states when they sell municipal bonds. 50 7 The
plurality conceded that, under previous authority, it appeared that states

496. Nuveen Brief, supra note 321, at 10-15; see ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULTEN,
LAW AND ECONOMICS 46 (1988).

497. See, e.g., Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 13-14; Viard Brief, supra note 120, at
21-23.
498. See, e.g., Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 21-23.
499. Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 14 ("In taxing interest income, [the state] is not
acting as a market participant, but as a sovereign state exercising the power of mandatory
taxation."); Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 23 (arguing that taxing is a "quintessentially
regulatory" act).
500. Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 22 ("[The state] uses the income tax system to
discriminate after the market transaction has occurred and separate from it."); see, e.g., Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 141.010, 141.020 (LexisNexis 2006).
501. See Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 22.
502. Id.
503. Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 11-15; Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 21-23.
504. Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 22 ("There is a substantive distinction between a
state's decision to discriminate against interstate commerce by means of its governmental
taxing authority and a state's decision to discriminate as a market participant by paying
different rates of interest to different holders."); see also Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324,
at 11-15.
505. Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 14 ("Even if it could be said that Kentucky is
competing' with the private bond market, the relevant action in this case is its use of the
taxing power, which is an exercise of governmental authority that no other market
participant could exercise."); Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 22-23 ("The market participant
exception has been traditionally justified by analogizing states to private market participants,
with the implication that states should be as free to act in the market in the same manner as
private parties." (citing Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 439 & n.12 (1980))).
506. See Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1811-14 (2008) (plurality opinion).
507. See id. Some of the Justices did not join this part of the analysis because they
thought the application of the government entity exemption adequately resolved the issue.
See id. at 1821 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (finding the case readily resolved by United
Haulers);id. at 1821 (Scalia, J., concurring) (same).
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would invite dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny by setting taxes. 508 The
plurality went on, however, to distinguish cases such as New Energy and
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, where the differential tax scheme affected
private parties. 50 9 Essentially, the plurality agreed with the proponents of
the market-participant rationale for the discriminatory tax system,
determining that, under the selective tax system, the state acts in two roles
at once. 5 10 According to the Court, "[i]t simply blinks this reality to
disaggregate... [the] two roles and pretend that in exempting the income
from its securities, [the State] is independently regulating or regulating in
the garden variety way that has made a State vulnerable to the dormant
in the market "and its tax
Commerce Clause." 5'1 The state is participating
512
structure is one of the tools of competition.
3. Government Entity Exception
Under the government entity exception, states and municipalities may
discriminate in favor of government entities at the expense of private
entities.5 1 3 The government entity exception is an acknowledgement of the
fundamental differences between economic protection of a private entity
and economic protection of a government entity. 514 These differences
include the purpose of such a law, the presence of discrimination, the
presence of interference, and the presence of ratification. 5 15 In Davis, the
entity exception applies to the
Court determined that the government 516
differential taxation of government bonds.
The first fundamental difference between economic protection of a
private entity and economic protection of a government entity is the
purpose of each law. 5 17 Laws favoring private entities beget "simple
economic protectionism"-the core evil the Commerce Clause was
designed to prevent. 5 18 Laws favoring government entities can further a
number of legitimate purposes completely unrelated to economic

508. Id. at 1811-12 (plurality opinion).
509. Id. at 1812 ("[T]here is no ignoring the fact that imposing the differential tax scheme
makes sense only because [the State] is also a bond issuer.").
510. Id.
511. Id.
512. Id.
513. Id. at 1810.
514. See id. at 1810-11; United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt.
Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1795-97 (2007) (plurality opinion).
515. NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 25-26 ("The Court [has] held that the difference
between public and private entities is 'constitutionally significant."' (quoting United
Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1790 (plurality opinion))).
516. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1819 (plurality opinion).
517. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1795-96 (plurality opinion); see also NAST Brief,
supra note 321, at 26.
518. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1795-96 (plurality opinion) (citing Wyoming v.
Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992)).
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protectionism. 5 19 As mentioned earlier, proponents of differential taxation
and critics of differential taxation disagree about on which side of the ledger
the differential taxation of conduit bonds falls. 520
Proponents of differential taxation argue that the selective tax exemption
for in-state municipal bonds furthers the legitimate goal of protecting
citizens' health, safety, and welfare. 52 ' This position is grounded in their
earlier assessment of conduit bonds as essentially public. 522 These amici
have also argued that the exemption incentivizes citizens to participate in
each state's financial affairs. 523 Participation in such financial affairs can
have numerous benefits, including a more informed citizenry and an
additional check on local government. 524 These wholly legitimate goals are
completely unrelated to protectionism. 52 5 Here, "[b]ecause [the selective
tax system] does not favor in-State private business at the expense of outof-State businesses, it does not discriminate against interstate commerce for
526
purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause."
Critics of differential taxation argue that the selective tax exemption for
in-state conduit bonds favors private entities and begets simple economic
protectionism. 527 The government entity exemption is founded upon the
fundamental difference between economic protection of private entities and
the economic protection of government entities. 528 According to these
amici, conduit bonds fund private entities.5 29
Thus, in the
most
530
fundamental sense, the government entity exception is inapplicable.

519. Id.; Multistate Tax Comm'n Brief, supra note 321, at 7; NAST Brief, supra note
321, at 27. Such legitimate purposes include funding educational programs at all levels;
building government buildings; erecting bridges, highways, and airports; constructing public
utilities and hospitals; and funding low income housing. Multistate Tax Comm'n Brief,
supra note 321, at 7; NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 3.
520. See supra Part II.A.
521. See, e.g., GFOA Brief, supra note 321, at 18 (noting that the differential tax system
enables "a range of public services and public works" (citing J.W. TEMEL, THE
FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 53-55 (5th ed. 2001))); Multistate Tax Comm'n
Brief, supra note 321, at 7 ("State and local governments issue municipal bonds to raise
funds to support general government needs or to fund public works projects and programs."
(citing NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 3)); NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 27 ("The tax
exemption facilitates the borrowing of funds by [Kentucky] and [their] political subdivisions
to support important government programs and projects.").
522. See supra Part II.A; see also NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 3; Nuveen Brief, supra
note 321, at 10-11.
523. NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 27 (determining that local citizens have a greater
interest in local bonds); Nuveen Brief, supra note 321, at 10-13 (determining that the
differential tax system encourages state citizens to develop and utilize a specialized
knowledge of local conditions and local investments).
524. NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 27; Nuveen Brief, supra note 321, at 10-13.
525. See NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 27-29; Nuveen Brief, supra note 321, at 10-20.
526. NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 27.
527. See Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 3-15; Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 9-21.
528. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S.Ct.
1786, 1795-96 (2007) (plurality opinion).
529. See NFMA Brief, supra note 17, at 6-7.
530. See NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 24-25.
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The second fundamental difference, critics argue, is the presence of
discrimination. 53 1 While the differential taxation of municipal bonds
appears to involve per se discrimination between in-state municipal bonds
and out-of-state municipal bonds, this is not the case. 532 Discrimination
"'assumes a comparison of substantially similar entities."' 5 33 When entities
provide substantially different products, they may be serving different
markets, in which case the entities would not be in competition. 534 The
discriminatory burden that the Commerce Clause is designed to reach is a
burden on competition. 535 Without competition, there is no burden on
536
interstate commerce.
Proponents of differential taxation argue that in-state municipal bonds do
not compete with any other debt issuances because municipal bonds and
private debt issuances are not substantially similar. 537 State and local
governments are "vested with the responsibility of protecting the health,
safety, and welfare of [their] citizens." 538 Municipal bonds are issued to
help state and local governments meet these responsibilities. 539 According
to proponents of differential taxation, this purpose distinguishes municipal
bonds from private debt issuances. 540 Because they serve different
markets, municipal bonds and private debt issuances are not in
products is, under the
competition.541 Any differential treatment of these
542
government entity exception, nondiscriminatory.
Critics of differential taxation dismiss this argument, claiming that the
differential taxation of municipal bonds affects the municipal bonds issued
by sister states and municipalities. 54 3 They argue that even if all municipal
531. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1795 (plurality opinion); NAST Brief, supra note 321,
at 25-26.
532. See GFOA Brief, supra note 321, at 18-20; NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 27;
SIFMA Brief, supra note 112, at 5-8.
533. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1795 (plurality opinion) (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v.
Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298 (1997)).
534. See id.; Gen. Motors, 519 U.S. at 299.
535. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994).
536. Gen. Motors, 519 U.S. at 299.
537. NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 27; Nuveen Brief, supra note 321, at 2-3.
538. Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1809 (2008) (plurality opinion)
(alteration in original) (quoting United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste
Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1795 (2007) (plurality opinion)).
539. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1795-96 (plurality opinion). This characteristic of
municipal bonds has been challenged with regards to conduit bonds, a subcategory of
municipal bonds. See NFMA Brief, supra note 17, at 6-7; Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 25.
540. See GFOA Brief, supra note 321, at 16-19; Multistate Tax Comm'n Brief, supra
note 321, at 8-9; NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 27; Nuveen Brief, supra note 321, at 2-3;
SIFMA Brief, supra note 112, at 6-7.
541. GFOA Brief, supra note 321, at 16-18; Multistate Tax Comm'n Brief, supra note
321, at 8-9; NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 26-27.
542. Multistate Tax Comm'n Brief, supra note 321, at 9; NAST Brief, supra note 321, at
27; Nuveen Brief, supra note 321, at 3.
543. Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 3-4 (likening the differential taxation system to
an "exit toll" hindering interstate commerce); Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 9-10
(determining that state subsidies of in-state transactions discourages transactions with out-ofstate sellers).

CONDUIT BONDS

2009]

bonds funded public health, safety, and welfare, that feature alone would
not distinguish in-state municipal bonds from out-of-state municipal
bonds. 544 Both
bond issuances serve the same market and are in direct
54 5
competition.
Proponents of differential taxation disagree with these critics'
characterization. 546 According to proponents of differential taxation, instate municipal bonds do not compete with out-of-state municipal bonds
because, when a state enters an extra-state market, they are treated like any
other market participant. 54 7 Although extraterritorial municipal bonds
advance the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of their respective
sister states, when state governments sell bonds outside their borders they
lose the benefit of sovereignty. 54 8 As regular market participants, their
municipal bonds do not compete with in-state municipal bonds. 549 Thus,
because in-state municipal bonds do not compete with any other debt
issuances, the differential tax treatment of municipal bonds is not
discriminatory.

550

The Court in Davis has already resolved this issue as applied to
government bonds. 55 1 The Court agreed with the proponents' reasoning
that, when a state enters an extra-state market, they are treated like any
other market participant. 552 As applied to conduit bonds, the issue returns
squarely to the argument over whether conduit bonds benefit private
industry or whether they benefit the public. 5 53 The outcome hinges on how
conduit bonds are characterized.
The third fundamental difference between economic protection of a
private entity and economic protection of a government entity is the
presence of interference. 554 According to proponents of differential
taxation, examining laws favoring public entities under standard dormant
Commerce Clause analysis "would lead to unprecedented and unbounded

544. See Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 9-10 (determining that in-state and out-of-state
municipal bond funds are in competition).
545. See Multistate Tax Comm'n Brief, supra note 321, at 13-14; Viard Brief, supra note
120, at 9-10.
546. See generally GFOA Brief, supra note 321, at 16-19; Multistate Tax Comm'n Brief,
supra note 321, at 4-11; NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 27; Nuveen Brief, supra note 321,
at 2-3.
547. See NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 13 (citing Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592,
594 (1881)).
548. See Bonaparte, 104 U.S. at 594 (holding that the registered public debt of one state
is taxable by another state when "owned by a resident of the latter State").
549. See NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 13; SIFMA Brief, supra note 112, at 8-9.
550. NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 13; SIFMA Brief, supra note 112, at 8-9.
551. See Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S.Ct. 1801, 1805 n.2 (2008) (plurality opinion)
(drawing a distinction between governmental bonds and private-activity bonds); id. at 1819
(resolving the issue as applied to governmental bonds).
552. See id. at 1819.
553. See supra Part II.A.
554. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S.Ct.
1786, 1796 (2007) (plurality opinion); NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 26.
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interference by the courts with state and local government. ' 555 Such
interference would convert the dormant Commerce Clause into a "roving
license" for federal courts to oversee state and local governments. 556 Under
this argument, federal courts should not be allowed to oversee the selective
tax treatment of municipal bonds since this treatment encompasses the
traditional and typical state government function of revenue generation.557
According to critics of differential taxation, the laws do not favor public
entities; they favor private parties. 558 The Court's reluctance to investigate
local government only applies where "a local government engages in a
traditional government function." 5 59 A court will be hesitant to intrude
only where a statute has a legitimate purpose unrelated to simple economic
560
protectionism and does not discriminate against interstate commerce.
When state and local government is not engaging in a traditional
government function, courts must intercede. 56 1 Thus, the standard dormant
Commerce Clause analysis is not merely appropriate for a review of562the
differential taxation of conduit bonds; it is required by the Constitution.
As explained at the outset of Part II, the ultimate issue is whether the
differences between conduit bonds and governmental bonds render the
reasoning of Davis inapplicable. 563 Part II.A identified the different groups
that have argued each side of the issue. 564 Part II.A also identified the
reasoning supporting the conflicting analyses, 56 5 and Part II.B went on to
explain how each analysis informed the argument for and against the
constitutionality of the discriminatory tax system as applied to conduit
bonds. 566 Part III of this Note identifies a solution that addresses the
concerns of proponents and critics of the discriminatory taxation of conduit
bonds. The solution is to appropriate a strict interpretation of the public
purpose test as a litmus test for whether the discriminatory taxation of a
given bond issuance violates the dormant Commerce Clause.

555. GFOA Brief, supra note 321, at 17 (reasoning that such oversight would lead to
"unprecedented and unbounded" interference (quoting United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1796
(plurality opinion))); NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 26 (citing United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at
1795-96 (plurality opinion)); Nuveen Brief, supra note 321, at 8 (determining that such
oversight is "unwarranted under the guise of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine").
556. NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 26.
557. GFOA Brief, supra note 321, at 17; NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 26; Nuveen
Brief, supra note 321, at 8.
558. See, e.g., Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 8-10; Viard Brief, supra note 120, at
20-25.
559. Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1810 (2008) (plurality opinion) (citing
United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1796 (plurality opinion)).
560. See Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 11; Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 22-23.
561. Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 10; Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 22-23.
562. Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 10.
563. See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
564. See supra notes 321-27.
565. See supra Part II.A.
566. See supra Part II.B.
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III. RECOMMENDING A SUI GENERIS ASSESSMENT FOR EACH ISSUANCE OF
CONDUIT BONDS

The question of whether conduit bonds advance public or private
interests has shaped the arguments for and against the differential taxation
of these bonds.5 67 These arguments ignore the inherent variety among
individual issuances of such bonds. 56 8 State and local governments have
only narrow limitations on their ability to issue municipal bonds.5 69 As a
result, state and local governments are often free to structure municipal
bonds how they see fit.5 70 Because of this variety, any assessment of
conduit bonds that views all conduit bond issuances as either inherently
public or inherently private is either overbroad or underinclusive.
The final part of this Note argues for a sui generis assessment of each
issuance of conduit bonds that is similar to the public purpose test. This
part begins by outlining the arguments forwarded by proponents and critics
of differential taxation and identifying their strengths and weaknesses. The
part goes on to explain what a sui generis assessment of each issuance
would entail, the benefits of such an assessment, and the foreseeable
burdens of adoption. This part concludes with a balancing of the benefits
and the burdens of a sui generis assessment and a final determination that
the benefits outweigh the burdens.
A. THE SOLUTIONS PROPOSEDBYPROPONENTS AND CRITICS OF THE
DIFFERENTIAL TAxATION OF CONDUIT BONDS ARE INADEQUATE

Both proponents and critics of the differential taxation of conduit bonds
found their arguments on their determinations of the general character of
conduit bonds. 57 1 While the determinations are alternately overbroad or
underinclusive, the arguments are often sound. The next section of this
Note examines the merits of the arguments advanced by proponents and
critics of the differential taxation of conduit bonds. At certain points, the
assessment requires the universe of conduit bonds to be divided into
discrete groups: conduit bonds that advance public interests (public-interest
conduit bonds) and conduit bonds that advance private interests (privateinterest conduit bonds). For now, the difference between these groups is
theoretical; the discussion of how to distinguish public-interest conduit
bonds from private-interest conduit bonds is left for Part III.B.

567. See supra Part II.A.
568. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND, supra note 1,at 21-22.
569. See id.; see also supra Part I.A.1 (discussing the limits on state and local
governments' power to issue bonds).
570. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND, supra note 1, at 21-22.
571. See supra Part II.A.
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I. Standard Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis
The purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause is to "to prohibit state or
municipal laws whose object is local economic protectionism. ' 572 The
standard dormant Commerce Clause analysis is designed to target such laws
and invalidate them. 573 Proponents of the differential taxation of conduit
bonds essentially evade this argument and forward a sui generis exception
for all municipal bonds. 574 This argument is rooted in equity and the
authority of states as sovereigns. 57 5 According to these proponents, equity
requires that the current system of differential taxation remains in force
because states and municipalities have undertaken large-scale capital
projects on the presumption of their validity; because in-state bondholders
relied on the application of the tax exemption; and because revocation of
the tax exemption would create an inequitable windfall for in-state
bondholders who purchased out-of-state municipal bonds with the
understanding that the interest on such bonds would be subject to state
income tax. 576 These proponents further argue that, due to long-standing
congressional acquiescence, the authority to institute a differential tax
system has been subsumed into the authority of states as sovereigns. 577
As applied to private-interest conduit bonds-as opposed to all municipal
bonds-these arguments are unpersuasive. First, with regard to the equity
argument, the market for conduit bonds is only a portion of the municipal
bond market. 578 Since private-interest conduit bonds only make up part of
the market for conduit bonds, the consequences of invalidating the
differential tax system are of a lesser magnitude than the proponents posit.
While it is impossible to know the exact size of this impact, it is
unreasonable to believe that invalidating the exemption as applied only to
private-interest conduit bonds would jeopardize state and local budgets. 5 79
Second, although in-state bondholders relied on the application of the tax
exemption when they purchased the municipal bonds, the differential tax
system is merely a body of laws that act upon the bond issuance after the
transaction is complete-it is not a contractual provision included in the
bond. 580 The bondholders reap the benefit of the differential tax system but
they are not entitled to it. 58 1 Finally, unlike the retroactive rescission feared
572. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994); see also

supra notes 152-58 and accompanying text.
573.
574.
575.
576.
577.
578.

See
See
See
See
See
See

supra notes 152-58 and accompanying text.
supra notes 373-422 and accompanying text.
supra notes 373-422 and accompanying text.
supra notes 378-406 and accompanying text.
supra notes 407-22 and accompanying text.
U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 128, at 3-4 (finding the large

majority of bonds in the municipal bond market are governmental bonds).
579. Cf Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 23-25 (arguing that the municipal bond
market would not be affected by repeal of the differential tax treatment).

580. Id. at 23 (positing "tax exclusions, exemptions, and deductions are matters of
legislative grace").
581. Id.
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by proponents of the differential tax system, 582 the proposed solution of
invalidating the differential tax as applied to private-interest conduit bonds
does not create a windfall for in-state purchasers holding out-of-state
municipal bonds.
Proponents' second argument for sui generis exception-that the power
to selectively tax all municipal bonds has been usurped by states as
sovereigns-is unavailing as applied to all municipal bond issuances, not
merely private-interest conduit bonds. 583 Proponents found their argument
on the long-standing congressional acquiescence to the differential tax
system and the "strong tradition of . . . deferring to Congress's
584
superintendence of interstate commerce" in matters of state taxation.
These arguments belie the fact that the power to regulate interstate
commerce lies with Congress, not the states. 585 For all of proponents'
claims of acquiescence, it is unclear how Congress's tolerance of the
selective tax system transfers an enumerated power from the federal
government to the states.
Critics of differential taxation correctly argue that the selective taxation
of conduit bonds promotes in-state business at the expense of out-of-state
businesses.586 By definition, conduit bonds fund private interestsregardless of whether those private interests ultimately benefit the
public. 587 When a state selectively exempts the interest earned on in-state
conduit bonds from income tax while taxing the interest earned on out-ofstate conduit bonds, it is promoting in-state businesses at the expense of
out-of-state businesses. 58 8 The selective tax exemption ultimately exists to
protect local economies and, thus, it is exactly the kind of activity the
dormant Commerce Clause is designed to prevent. 589 Since the selective
taxation of private-interest conduit bonds does not survive the dormant
Commerce Clause inquiry, it is necessary to determine whether the

582. See NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 18.
583. See Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 22-26 (arguing that overturning the
differential tax system would not infringe state sovereignty); Viard Brief, supra note 120, at
16 (determining that the states' role as sovereign is both "obviously true" and "irrelevant to
this case").
584. GFOA Brief, supra note 321, at 12.
585. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power To . . . regulate
Commerce... among the several States .... ").
586. Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 5-10; Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 9-13.
587. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
588. See Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 5-10; Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 9-13.
589. See Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 5-10; Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 9-13.
Since the differential tax exemption fails the first prong of the dormant Commerce Clause
analysis, there is no need to reach the second prong. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137, 142 (1970). However, based on the plurality's holding in Davis, it is unlikely that
the selective taxation of private-interest conduit bonds would fail the second prong of the
standard dormant Commerce Clause analysis. See Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct.
1801, 1810 (2008) (plurality opinion) (determining that the Pike analysis is ill-suited for
assessing the benefits of overturning the differential tax system).
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selective taxation of private-interest conduit bonds is subject to any of the
exceptions to the standard dormant Commerce Clause analysis. 590
2. Market Participation Exception
Under the market participation exception, states and municipalities may
discriminate in favor of their own citizens when they act as market
participants. 59 1 According to the Court, the dormant Commerce Clause is
directed at market regulation, and market participation exists outside of the
realm of market regulation. 592 Proponents of differential taxation argue
that the selective tax system constitutes market participation. 593 Critics of
differential taxation claim that taxation is the classic case of market
regulation and that states can not claim the protection of the market
594
participant exception when regulating a market.
Taxation is market regulation. 595 Although proponents try to aggregate
the sale of municipal bonds and the subsequent tax exemption into a single
act of market participation, 596 the taxation of the bonds and the sale of the
bonds are separate. 5 97 A state does not participate in a market when it taxes
its citizens. 59 8 In a part of the Davis plurality joined by only two Justices,
Justice David Souter argues otherwise, attempting to distinguish the sale of
599
governmental bonds from unconstitutional discriminatory taxes.
According to Justice Souter, the selective taxation of governmental bonds is
materially different from the taxes in New Energy and Camps
Newfound/Owatonna because the taxation of governmental bonds does not
affect private parties. 600 While this argument may be valid, 60 1 it is
inapplicable to conduit bonds. 602 Conduit bonds affect private parties and,
therefore, the discriminatory taxation of conduit bonds is indistinguishable
590. See supra Part I.B.
591. See White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 208 (1983)
(citing Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 n.7 (1980)).
592. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 436.
593. See supra notes 492-96 and accompanying text.
594. See supra notes 497-505 and accompanying text.
595. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 588-89
(1997); New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988).
596. See NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 24; Nuveen Brief, supra note 321, at 10.
597. See Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 22 ("There is a substantive distinction between a
state's decision to discriminate against interstate commerce by means of its governmental
taxing authority and a state's decision to discriminate as a market participant by paying
different rates of interest to different holders."); see also Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324,
at 11-15.
598. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 588-89.
599. Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1811-14 (2008) (plurality opinion).
600. Id. at 1814 ("The Kentucky tax scheme falls outside of the forbidden paradigm
because the Commonwealth's direct participation favors, not local private entrepreneurs, but
the Commonwealth and local governments.").
601. See id. at 1821 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (deciding not to reach the market
participation analysis because the case was decided under the government entity exception);
Id. at 1821 (Scalia, J., concurring) (same).
602. See supra note I and accompanying text.
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from the unconstitutional discriminatory taxes in New Energy and Camps
603
Newfound/Owatonna.
3. Government Entity Exception
Under the government entity exception, economic protection of a
government entity against private entities is not susceptible to Commerce
Clause scrutiny. 60 4
This exception is founded on the fundamental
difference between those laws whose object is local protectionism and those
laws whose object is advancing the public interest. 60 5 The Court identified
four fundamental differences between these practices: the purpose of the
law, the presence of discrimination, the presence of interference, and the
presence of ratification. 60 6 In Davis, the plurality determined that this
6 07
exception applies to the selective taxation of governmental bonds.
Proponents of selective taxation argue that the selective taxation of
conduit bonds is subject to the government entity exception. 60 8 Under this
argument, conduit bonds-despite financing private industry-advance the
public interest. 609 States and municipalities issue such bonds for the
traditional and typical state government function of revenue generation for
public works that benefit the citizenry, not for the protection of local
industries. 6 10 The differential taxation of in-state municipal bonds is
nondiscriminatory because discrimination "'assumes a comparison of
substantially similar entities' 6 1 1 and in-state municipal bonds, by nature of
being issued by the sovereign for a public purpose, are dissimilar from all
other debt issuances. 612 Examining the selective tax system under the
standard dormant Commerce Clause analysis "would lead to unprecedented
and unbounded interference by the courts," thereby converting the dormant
Commerce Clause into a "roving license." 6 13 Finally, although proponents
of selective taxation never addressed the issue of ratification, the argument
for ratification as applied to conduit bonds would likely be identical to the
argument for ratification as applied to government bonds: in both
instances, the burden of the state regulation-here, the extra taxes by
603. Cf Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 7-10 (comparing compensating use taxes,
which were found constitutional in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 588 (1937),
with the discriminatory tax in New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74

(1988)).
604. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1810 (plurality opinion).
605. See id. at 1809; United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt.
Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1796 (2007) (plurality opinion).
606. See id. at 1810-11.
607. See id. at 1819.
608. See supra notes 521-26, 537-42, 546-50, 555-57 and accompanying text.

609. See supra notes 521-26.
610. See supra notes 338-41, 360-63 and accompanying text.
611. United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct.
1786, 1795 (2007) (plurality opinion) (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278,

298 (1997)).
612. See supra notes 537-42 and accompanying text.
613. See NAST Brief, supra note 321, at 26.
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residents who purchase out-of-state municipal bonds-falls on the citizens
14
of the state rather than on the citizens of a sister state. 6
Critics of selective taxation argue that the selective taxation of conduit
bonds is not subject to the government entity exception. 6 15 Their core
contention is that the purpose of the tax exemption is simple economic
protectionism. 6 16 Additionally, these critics argue that differential taxation
of in-state conduit bonds is discriminatory because conduit bonds compete
against all other debt issuances. 617 Finally, these critics argue that courts
are only reluctant to intrude when a statute has a purpose unrelated to
618
simple economic protectionism.
Proponents of selective taxation of conduit bonds are correct that the
government entity exception applies to the selective taxation of conduit
bonds-provided that the conduit bonds actually do advance the public
interest. 6 19 As discussed earlier, not every issuance of conduit bonds
actually advances the public interest. 620 Where an issuance of conduit
bonds does not advance a legitimate public interest, the purpose of the tax
exemption is economic protectionism and the tax exemption is
unconstitutional. 62 1 Thus, both proponents and critics are correct in their
reasoning. The issue, then, is how to distinguish between conduit bonds
that advance a legitimate public interest and conduit bonds that do not. Part
III.B advances a workable solution.
B. ANARGUMENT FOR ADOPTING A SUI GENERIS ASSESSMENT FOR EACH
ISSUANCE OF CONDUIT BONDS

In order to distinguish between private-interest conduit bonds and publicinterest conduit bonds, the Court should perform a sui generis assessment
that is similar to the public purpose test. Currently, the public purpose test
is used to determine whether a bond issuance violates the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 62 2 Under this test, if the revenue
generated by the issuance is used for a private purpose, the bond issuance is
an unconstitutional taking of property without due process of law. 623
A sui generis assessment would apply a framework similar to the public
purpose test to determine whether a bond issuance is issued solely for the
purpose of simple economic protectionism.
Like the public/private
distinction of the public purpose test, the economic protectionism inquiry
would be very fact specific. Also like the public purpose test, each state
614. See Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1811-14 (2008) (plurality opinion);

see also supra note 1 and accompanying text.
615. See supra notes 527-30, 543-45, 558-62 and accompanying text.
616. See supra notes 527-30 and accompanying text.
617. See supra notes 543-45 and accompanying text.
618. See supra notes 558-62 and accompanying text.
619. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1810-11 (plurality opinion).
620. See supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
621. See Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 5-10; Viard Brief, supra note 120, at 9-13.
622. See supra notes 33-52 and accompanying text.
623. See supra notes 33-52 and accompanying text.
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would have license to develop a test for determining whether the purpose of
a bond issuance is simple economic protectionism. The universal element
of this assessment, however, would be that the inquiry is centered on
whether the object of the issuance is simple economic protectionism. If the
object of an issuance is simple economic protectionism, the issuance is
constitutional, but selective taxation of the issuance is not.
There are three primary benefits to adopting this sui generis framework.
First, this solution targets the specific issuances prohibited by the dormant
Commerce Clause. 624 Thus, states are able to utilize the private sector to
benefit the general public but are prevented from Balkanizing the private
sector by insulating local markets. 625 Second, this solution limits the
impact on the municipal bond market since the only bonds affected by the
practice are private-interest conduit bonds. Finally, because the proposed
framework is essentially an outgrowth of the public purpose doctrine, courts
applying this test will have the benefit of the case law that developed the
state public purpose tests.
There are two significant burdens to adopting this sui generis framework.
First, it is unclear what impact the implementation of sui generis
assessment would have on the municipal bond marketplace. Any forecast
of the impact of instituting this framework is purely speculative, and
competing concerns tend to predict alternate outcomes. 626 This burden is
limited somewhat by the scope of the proposed assessment: it only applies
to conduit bonds, and the selective tax exemption will only be invalidated if
the object of the individual bond issuance is simple economic
protectionism. Second, this decision could dramatically increase the
judicial workload since any citizen subject to a selective tax exemption who
purchases an out-of-state conduit bond would potentially have a cause of
action.
On balance, the benefits of sui generis assessment outweigh the burdens.
The development of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis illustrates that
the core concern of the Court has been to tailor the analysis to allow state
action that falls short of local economic protectionism. 627 Preventing such
protectionism is the core concern of the Court, and the fears about the
consequence to the marketplace and judicial workload, though legitimate,
Therefore, the Court should adopt this sui generis
are secondary.
framework.

624. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of the
dormant Commerce Clause).
625. See supra notes 152-58 and accompanying text (discussing how the dormant
Commerce Clause works to prevent economic Balkanization).
626. Compare NFMA Brief, supra note 17, at 16-23 (predicting a widespread
realignment of the municipal bond marketplace in the event the differential tax system was
invalidated), with Tax Found. Brief, supra note 324, at 23-24 (determining that the
revocation of the differential tax system would not have a significant impact on the
municipal bond market).
627. See supra Part I.B.
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CONCLUSION

The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to determine if the selective taxation of
conduit bonds violates the dormant Commerce Clause. Proponents and
critics of selective taxation have argued that conduit bonds should be
viewed as either inherently public or inherently private and that the
application of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis should hinge on this
assessment. This Note recognizes the inherent variety of conduit bonds and
recommends the adoption of a fact-specific, sui generis assessment to
determine whether the ultimate purpose of the bonds is local economic
protectionism. By tailoring the inquiry to deny the benefit of the selective
tax system only from those bonds that stifle interstate commerce, the
solution proposed by this Note retains the fundamental protection of the
dormant Commerce Clause while leaving state and local governments free
to employ their powers.

